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I. INTRODUCTION
Human consumption of water has increased nine-fold since 1900 as the
result of changing technologies, changing production methods, and changing
lifestyles and personal habits.1  This century, worldwide population numbers
are continuing to climb, resulting in increased overall water demand.  Mean-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, and Co-Director, Water
Resources Research Initiative.  I am grateful to Blake Carlile for his stellar research, as well
as to the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School of Law Saltman Center for inviting
me to speak at its Symposium on the Colorado River.  I presented an earlier version of this
article as a panelist at the American Bar Association’s annual water conference in February
2008.
1 Peter H. Gleick, Making Every Drop Count, SCI. AM., Feb. 18, 2001, at 40, 42.  The total
amount of water withdrawn since 1900 has increased nine-fold, while per capita usage has
doubled. Id.
994
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while, supplies of available freshwater resources are likely to decline in the not
too distant future as a result of climate change.2
To alleviate conflicts and stretch scarce resources as far as possible, fed-
eral and state governments have taken pains to emphasize collaborative deci-
sionmaking as a means of accomplishing conservation goals.  The Western
Governors’ Association and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have
both adopted a set of “Enlibra” principles intended to promote flexibility and
innovation while avoiding litigation, torn communities, and natural resource
wars.3  Enlibra embraces collaborative processes for natural resources develop-
ment, the globalization of resource markets, pollution, population growth, and
land use patterns,4 and encourages regulators and stakeholders to choose “mar-
kets before mandates” whenever possible.5
The water world is by no means immune to the heightened fervor to pro-
mote market-based solutions to resource scarcity and misallocation.6  From
Texas’s u¨ber-entrepreneur T. Boone Pickens to Ontario’s Nova Company,
schemes to profit from large-scale water transfers have proliferated in the past
decade or so.  Meanwhile, on the international front, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund have encouraged nations, particularly those in the
developing world, to conform to a market paradigm by privatizing and thereby
maximizing use of their water supplies.7  Affected communities are often less
than enthusiastic. Reactions from academics and other observers range from
2 See NEIL ADGER ET AL., CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESS-
MENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at http://www.gtp89.dial.pipex.com/spm.pdf (predicting
that water availability may decrease by 10-30% in some mid-latitude dry regions and in the
dry tropics by mid-century).
3 Western Governors’ Association, Enlibra, http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/enlibra/
(last visited May 28, 2008).  EPA Administrator Steve Johnson and former Administrator
Mike Leavitt have endorsed Enlibra Principles to “emphasize[ ] collaboration instead of
polarization, national standards and neighborhood solutions, markets instead of mandates,
solutions that transcend political boundaries, and other common sense ideas that will acceler-
ate environmental progress.”  Environmental Stewardship, Office of the Administrator,
USEPA, Enlibra Principles, http://www.epa.gov/adminweb/leavitt/enlibra.htm (last visited
May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Enlibra Principles].  Former Interior Secretary Gale Norton
championed “[t]he 4 C’s—conservation through cooperation, communication and consulta-
tion”—throughout her tenure. See 4 C’S WORKING GROUP, LEAVING A 4 C’S LEGACY:  A
FRAMEWORK FOR SHARED COMMUNITY STEWARDSHIP 86 (2003), available at http://www.
blm.gov/4Cs/4CsFinalReport_Sec7.pdf.  Secretary Kempthorne is continuing the theme of
“Cooperative Conservation.” See Cooperative Conservation, http://cooperativeconservation.
gov/ (last visited May 28, 2008).  For an assessment of the Enlibra Principles, see Gary C.
Bryner, Policy Devolution and Environmental Law:  Exploring the Transition to Sustainable
Development, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2002).
4 Enlibra Principles, supra note 3.
5 Western Governors’ Association, supra note 3.
6 See Christine A. Klein, Water Independence:  The Case Against Transbasin Diversions,
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6 n.16) (citing twenty-
three articles published between 1988 and 2006 championing the development of water
markets).
7 See Mateen Thobani, Tradable Property Rights to Water:  How to Improve Water Use and
Resolve Water Conflicts, PUB. POL’Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR, Feb. 1995, at 1, 4 (claiming that
an economic model could “increase the productivity of water use, improve operations and
maintenance, stimulate private investment and economic growth, reduce water conflicts,
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outrage at the commoditization of this precious resource to support for letting
the market and its pricing signals move water to the most efficient use.8
On the Colorado River, conflicts over water use and allocation seem to
have become the norm rather than the exception.  Indeed, disputes arising from
conflicting and sometimes mutually exclusive needs of water users—irrigators,
cities, navigational interests, miners and other industries, and recreational
users—have festered on many river basins throughout the nation’s history.9  On
the Colorado and other western rivers, where scarcity is the driving force,10
market-based strategies may be one means of alleviating the effects of scarcity
and reallocating water supplies from old, inefficient uses to new, high value
uses.11  As Professor Douglas Grant concludes in his article in this Symposium
issue, collaborative agreements that enable intrabasin, interbasin, and interstate
reallocation could help the Colorado River basin states “cope with an ever-
growing imbalance between water supply and demand.”12
rationalize ongoing and future irrigation development, and free up government resources for
activities that have a public good content or positive externalities”).
8 Compare James Salzman, Thirst:  A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 94, 96 (2006) (describing the attempt to privatize water resources in Bolivia as
triggering a “morality play of rights versus markets, human need versus corporate greed”),
and Klein, supra note 6, at 11 (“In the case of long-distance water diversions, the over-
whelming human reaction has been [to] protest . . . .  This strong sense of water protection-
ism is particularly remarkable when compared to other natural resources.”), with Lawrence
S. Rothenberg, Incentives and Adaptation, in ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND WATER CON-
FLICT:  NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 213, 213-23, 234 (John T. Scholz
& Bruce Stiftel eds., 2005) (advocating water taxes and tradable permit schemes), Roger
Bate, Water—Can Property Rights and Markets Replace Conflict?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT:  PROMOTING PROGRESS OR PERPETUATING POVERTY? 239, 247-48 (Julian Morris
ed., 2002) (applauding Chile’s system of tradable water rights), and Robert Glennon, Water
Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1902 (2005) (noting that the
creation of clearly delineated property rights that enable market transfers can result in liber-
ating water supplies from outdated, inefficient uses).
9 For a discussion of conflicts over water resources in the Midwest and the East, see, e.g.,
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets in Riparian States, 21 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 305 (2004); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the South-
eastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
9 (2002); Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories:  Lessons from a
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471 (2007); Mark Squillace & Sandra
Zellmer, Managing Interjurisdictional Waters Under the Great Lakes Charter Annex, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2003, at 8; A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River:  The Paradox of
Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1997); Sandra B. Zellmer,
A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB. L. REV. 305 (2004).
10 Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages:  The
Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964 (2008); see David H. Getches, Water
Management in the United States and the Fate of the Colorado River Delta in Mexico, 11
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 107, 107-08 (2003) (describing over-allocated status of the Colorado River
and the effects of over-use on Mexico and the Delta); Tarlock, supra note 9, at 9-11 (draw-
ing parallels between river restoration efforts on the Missouri River, which has such abun-
dant flows that it frequently floods, and the Colorado River, which suffers from too little
supply and too much demand).
11 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER MANAGEMENT:  EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 57
(2007) (concluding that reallocation of even a small percentage of agricultural water could
go a long way toward meeting urban needs).
12 Grant, supra note 10, at 993.
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While the merits of market-based solutions to water conflicts are subject
to debate, few could argue that collaborative strategies are more desirable than
adversarial, winner-take-all water wars.13  In the spirit of the “Collaboration on
the Colorado River” Symposium, it is safe to assume that some degree of col-
laboration to resolve contested resource management issues is a positive thing.
We can also assume, for the purposes of this Symposium Article, that collabo-
rative innovations that include some degree of marketing can be useful in
resolving water management disputes.14
Water banking, forbearance agreements, and other collaborative realloca-
tion options, however, may violate the anti-speculation provisions of western
water law.  The law of all western states prohibits speculation, either explicitly
or through requirements that water be applied continuously to actual, beneficial
use.15  Speculation is the act of acquiring a resource for the purpose of subse-
quent use or resale, in hopes of profiting from future price fluctuations.16  The
act of speculation is not inherently evil, and all sorts of resources, ranging from
13 Professor Robert Adler, one of the Symposium participants, makes a compelling case that
collaborative processes (involving marketing or other approaches) are not, in fact, optimal
for meeting river restoration objectives.
After a full decade of effort, it seems clear that the . . . stakeholder process is not suited to
making these hard choices [regarding Colorado River restoration].  None of the interest group
representatives are likely to concede that their interests can be eliminated or even significantly
curtailed to accommodate a single, common vision for canyon restoration.  As some program
scientists and officials observed, consensus is not “likely in the future because of mutually exclu-
sive objectives.”
Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy:  Lessons from the
Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 104 (2007) (footnote omitted).  Adler notes that
collaborative processes do not serve scientific objectives well either because processes that
strive for stakeholder consensus are too “slow to respond to the constantly changing direc-
tions” and to take advantage of sometimes time-limited experimental opportunities. Id. at
103.  For a thoughtful debate on the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative decision-
making, see Eric W. Orts & Cary Coglianese, Collaborative Environmental Law:  Pro and
Con, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2007).
14 See supra note 8. For a compelling case against relying on market-based solutions to
address water scarcity, see Klein, supra note 6, at 1, 15-19 (arguing that water markets foster
the nineteenth-century supply-side mentality that brings water to people at all costs, thereby
subsidizing an unsustainable addiction to growth).  For additional arguments against water
markets, see MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD:  THE FIGHT TO STOP THE
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 207-08 (2002); PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE
NEW ECONOMY OF WATER:  THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZA-
TION OF FRESH WATER 4-10 (2002); VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS:  PRIVATIZATION, POL-
LUTION AND PROFIT 20-30, 137-38 (2002). By contrast, Dan Tarlock offers a nuanced
assessment of water marketing as a conflict resolution tool, using the Truckee-Carson expe-
rience to suggest that solutions can arise from litigation, which performs a power realloca-
tion function, and then evolve to collaborative water management, including voluntary
transfers, to redress dislocations caused by change.  A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New
Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes:  The Case of the Truckee-Carson Settlement, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 674, 691 (1999).  For an assessment of how water supplies can be subject to
price controls and also be protected as a human right, see JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP
FOR SALE:  OUR DESPERATE BATTLE OVER WATER IN A WORLD ABOUT TO RUN OUT 95-96,
116-17, 119-37 (2001).
15 Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture:  The Inefficient Search for Effi-
ciency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 962-63 (1998).
16 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (8th ed. 2004).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ311.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-AUG-08 13:23
998 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:994
real estate to precious metals, are held for speculative purposes.  But locking up
scarce and essential water resources from use by individuals and communities
who have an immediate need to slake their thirst or grow crops on which to
sustain themselves is a mortal sin under western water law.  The universal pro-
hibition against speculation in water resources stems from the near universal
distrust of concentrated power over resources in the developing West, which in
turn was a foundational force in shaping the doctrine of beneficial use.17
The focus of this Article is whether the anti-speculation doctrine in west-
ern water law poses a continuing, insuperable impediment to collaborative,
market-based solutions and, if so, whether the doctrine ought to be dismantled.
The Article concludes that, although the doctrine does pose an obstacle to some
kinds of collaborative agreements that attempt to harness market forces for
future uses through forward-looking transactions, it continues to serve an
important public purpose.  The anti-speculation doctrine curbs the worst poten-
tial abuses of market forces by forcing transacting parties to articulate how and
when the water will be applied to actual, beneficial uses, and by providing an
administrative or judicial “check” on speculative transactions that adversely
affect third parties and ecological needs by depriving them of water.  Moreover,
exceptions for municipal planning, Indian reserved rights, and instream flow
protection operate as an effective safety valve to liberate collaborative initia-
tives that serve important, contemporary public purposes.
II. BEWARE OF WATER BARONS
Early twentieth century political commentator Matthew Josephson revived
the term “Robber Baron” from its archaic German roots and applied it to
Gilded Age billionaires who made their money in steel, oil, or railroads.18
Josephson hoped to convey the image of armored, greedy thugs who ransacked
each other’s estates and looted merchant caravans that passed by their castles.19
According to Josephson, the Robber Barons’ wealth was the product of elicit
gains due to anti-competitive practices and heavy-handed burdens levied upon
the workers and craftsmen of America.  Likewise, President Theodore
Roosevelt advocated an aggressive role for the federal government in trust-
busting—breaking up private concentrations of economic power in these
“malefactors of great wealth.”20
17 Neuman, supra note 15, at 963.
18 J. Bradford DeLong, Robber Barons (Jan. 1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://econ161.berkeley.edu/Econ_Articles/carnegie/delong_moscow_paper2.html (citing
MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS:  THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS 1861-
1901 (1934)).
19 Id.
20 Id. For details on Roosevelt’s trust-busting efforts, see infra Part V.  Not all commenta-
tors condemn the Robber Barons, noting that Andrew Carnegie and others made America
into a super-economy, if not a super-power, and contributed substantial sums to charitable
undertakings. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS:  HOW ANDREW CARNEGIE, JOHN D.
ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD, AND J.P. MORGAN INVENTED THE AMERICAN SUPERECONOMY
(2005); see THOMAS J. DILORENZO, HOW CAPITALISM SAVED AMERICA:  THE UNTOLD HIS-
TORY OF OUR COUNTRY, FROM THE PILGRIMS TO THE PRESENT 110-33 (2005) (arguing that
“robber barons” improved the lives of Americans by providing new and improved products
at lower prices).
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Today’s Robber Barons can be found not only in the offices of huge oil
and gas companies, like ExxonMobil and Enron, but also in the boardrooms of
diversified corporations like Nestle´ Waters, tycoons like T. Boone Pickens, and
even the basements of individuals in the water-rich Canadian provinces.21
These “Water Barons” have crafted schemes to privatize and sell water from
Mono Lake, the Ogallala (High Plains) Aquifer, the Great Lakes, and many
other waterbodies.
Yet not all privatization schemes are alike.  There are all sorts of varia-
tions and degrees of privatization, and this is especially true of natural
resources such as air, minerals, fisheries, and of course water.  Many blend
government regulation and oversight through tradable permits or other devices
with an element of private management.  Some of these strategies may be suita-
ble for management of water resources, and some may already be occurring in
some way, shape, or form.  A relatively uncontroversial, rather mundane form
of privatization enables a private company to design, construct, or operate a
municipal water system or wastewater treatment system, or to administer bill-
ing and revenue collection services.22  The type of privatization that raises con-
cerns in the water world is that which involves placing the assets—the resource
itself—in the hands of profit-driven firms, thereby interfering with the ability
of residents and local governments to manage their own supplies, as decision-
making becomes less transparent and opportunities for meaningful participation
become less available.23
Outright privatization of water can concentrate power in monopolistic pri-
vate firms,24 and nothing strikes fear into the hearts of westerners quite like the
specter of a water monopoly.25  The scenario depicted in the movie Chinatown
is the quintessential example of an early twentieth century water grab by the
rapidly growing city of Los Angeles from rural northern California farmers,26
leaving behind “a legacy of deception, violence, and environmental
devastation.”27
Monopolistic “water grabs” are no relic of the nation’s rough and tumble
past, however.  Proposals for large-scale, arguably speculative water transfers
by Water Barons seem to be on the rise these days.
Perhaps the most brazen of the modern-day Water Barons is T. Boone
Pickens.  This free-wheeling entrepreneur, widely known in the oil fields, has
21 See infra notes 28-32, 37-41, 46-49 and accompanying text.
22 Glennon, supra note 8, at 1890.
23 Id. at 1892-93.
24 Id. at 1893.
25 See Christine A. Klein, The Law of the Lakes:  From Protectionism to Sustainability,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (“There is something in the human spirit that responds
with great passion and outrage when outsiders—however defined—look beyond their own
backyards for a useable source of water.”).
26 CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974).  For quotes and a description of the movie, see
Chinatown Review by Tim Dirks, Chinatown (1974), http://www.filmsite.org/chin.html (last
visited May 28, 2008).
27 Klein, supra note 6, at 17; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE
WEST:  EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 38-39 (1992) (describing toxic dust
storms that result from Los Angeles’ transbasin diversions), cited in Klein, supra note 6, at
23.
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of late turned his attention to water, much to the dismay of residents surround-
ing his west Texas ranch.  In the late 1990s, Pickens determined that growing
municipalities could benefit by gaining access to the great quantities of Ogal-
lala Aquifer groundwater underlying his ranch, so he devised a plan to extract
and sell enough water to meet the demands of some 400,000 households a
year.28  According to Food and Water Watch, Pickens has been acquiring more
land overlying the Aquifer so that he can pump and sell as much as 200,000
acre-feet per year of water to one of the state’s large metropolitan centers.29
Pickens’ own website proclaims that his company, Mesa Water, is the largest
private holder of groundwater rights in the United States.30  In 2004, Pickens
announced that he anticipated receiving $500 an acre-foot from either Dallas-
Fort Worth or San Antonio, a price that includes the cost of delivering the
water through a nine-foot-diameter pipeline.31  To date, however, Pickens is
still waiting on a buyer.32
On the Colorado River, there have been a variety of proposals to transfer
water from the Upper Division states, which historically have not used their full
entitlement under the Colorado River Compact, to California and Nevada,
whose demand far exceeds their Compact allocations.33  Chevron Oil promoted
one such scheme to lease water to Nevada from a proposed reservoir near
Grand Junction, Colorado, until such time as Chevron was prepared to use the
water for oil shale development in Colorado.34  The Colorado River Basin
states resisted Chevron’s plan for fear of encouraging commoditization of water
and opening up unfettered water markets between the Upper and Lower
Basins.35  The Compact, however, prohibits Upper Division states from with-
28 See Robert Elder Jr., Pickens Hoping for River of Green:  Brazos Could Be Used to
Carry Panhandle Water to Thirsty Cities, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 15, 2003, at A1.
29 T. Boone Pickens in Texas, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/
water/corporations/t-boone-pickens-in-texas (last visited May 28, 2008).  For details on the
use of the Aquifer, see Sandra Zellmer, Boom and Bust on the Great Plains:  De´ja` vu All
Over Again, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).  Five hundred dollars per acre-foot
appears to be a mid-range price for water sales in Texas. See Richard E. Howitt, Water
Trades in the West:  Risk, Speculation, and Property Rights, ABA 26TH ANNUAL WATER
LAW CONF., Feb. 21-22, 2008, tbl.2 (depicting volume-weighted lease prices at $51/acre-foot
and sale prices at $956/acre-foot).
30 T. Boone Pickens, Ahead of His Time, http://www.boonepickens.com/man_ahead/
default.asp (last visited May 28, 2008).
31 T. Boone Pickens Believes Water Deal with Dallas-Fort Worth Possible Soon, DALLAS
BUS. J., June 23, 2004, http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2004/06/21/daily22.html.
32 T. Boone Pickens, Ahead of His Time, supra note 30.
33 James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from
the Colorado River Part I:  The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 321-22
(2001).
34 Id. at 323.
35 Id.  According to Lochhead, allowing interbasin transfers would defeat the Compact’s
objective of providing security through a perpetual allocation, id. at 330, while allowing “the
economic and political muscle of the Lower Division States to override the future of the
Upper Division States . . . [and] continue economic development at the expense of the Upper
Basin.” Id. at 324; see infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (discussing transfer
options under the new interim guidelines for Colorado River management).
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holding Colorado River water that they are unable to put to beneficial use,
thereby allowing any unused portion to flow downstream (without payment).36
Speculative schemes have cropped up in the eastern United States as well.
In 1998, Nova Group, a Canadian company allegedly founded in an individ-
ual’s basement in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, obtained a permit to export 600
million liters of Lake Superior water annually via tanker vessel to some uniden-
tified recipient in Asia.37  Nova’s proposal coincided with declining water
levels in the Great Lakes, and the resulting public outcry persuaded Ontario to
revoke the permit and also prompted the Canadian federal government to issue
an outright ban on the bulk export of water.38
Like the star from which its name was derived, the Nova Group soon
“fade[d] away to its former obscurity.”39  However, Nova’s proposal had tran-
scendent effects on water transfers on both sides of the border, in that it moti-
vated the eight states and two Canadian provinces bordering the Great Lakes to
adopt a measure known as “Annex 2001,” designed primarily to prevent large-
scale diversions from the basin.40  Meanwhile, many Canadian provinces,
including British Columbia and Ontario, enacted their own bans of bulk water
exports.41
In response to the Canadian bans, in 1999, California company Sun Belt
Water filed a notice of intent to submit a claim against the Canadian federal
government and the provincial government of British Columbia under
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor provisions, claiming over $200 million in lost
profits for not being allowed to purchase water for export.42  Although the Sun
Belt arbitration has not moved beyond the notice of intent,43 Sun Belt’s scheme
36 Grant, supra note 10, at 988; Lochhead, supra note 33, at 324-26; see Colorado River
Compact of 1922 art. III(e), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
37 Nova was subsequently revealed to be a shell company that had been put together by a
professor at an Ontario community college and a handful of his friends.  Milos Barutciski,
Trade Regulation of Fresh Water Exports:  The Phantom Menace Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 145, 148 (2002).
38 Squillace & Zellmer, supra note 9; see Eric Reguly, It’s Time Feds Came Clean on
Water, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 25, 1999, at B2 (describing the Canadian government’s policy
on water exports as the hottest trade and environmental issue facing Canada in the next
decade).  “Bulk export” is defined as “the siphoning of freshwater from lakes or other
sources for shipment through pipelines, diversions, or by sea on supertankers.”  Christopher
Scott Maravilla, The Canadian Bulk Water Moratorium and Its Implications for NAFTA, 10
CURRENTS:  INT’L TRADE L.J. 29, 29 (2001).
39 nova, Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/nova (last visited May 28, 2008).
40 Great Lakes Charter Annex:  A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter,
June 18, 2001, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter
Annex.pdf.
41 Maravilla, supra note 38, at 31.
42 Gregory F. Szydlowski, Note, The Commoditization of Water:  A Look at Canadian Bulk
Water Exports, the Texas Water Dispute, and the Ongoing Battle Under NAFTA for Control
of Water Resources, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 665, 676-77 (2007).
43 The Canadian government believes that no valid Chapter 11 claim has been filed.  Sun
Belt Water, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,
Dispute Settlement, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
disp-diff/sunbelt.aspx?lang=EN (last visited May 28, 2008).  For Sun Belt’s perspective,
along with pleadings and other documents, see Sun Belt Water—NAFTA—Bulk Water
Transport, http://www.sunbeltwater.com/index.shtml (last visited May 28, 2008).
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was the first serious effort to turn Canada’s water into an international com-
modity.44  Unlike Nova, Sun Belt owner Jack Lindsey has refused to fade qui-
etly into the sunset.  Lindsey, an individual with “no shortage of chutzpah,” is
still trying to sell British Columbia water from defunct pulp mills and other
sources.45
Another type of water marketing scheme, albeit one that is not terribly
speculative given immediate and rapidly growing demand, comes from the bot-
tled water sector.  In a well-publicized dispute, Michigan residents, outraged by
a proposal of Nestle´ Waters to construct groundwater withdrawal and bottling
facilities for its new product line, Ice Mountain, took to the streets in protest
and blocked truckloads of bottled water from leaving the plant.46  Michigan
Citizens for Water Conservation, a group of riparians and other interested
residents, took to the courts as well, alleging that groundwater pumping would
adversely affect a nearby stream in violation of the public trust doctrine and
other Michigan laws.47  The public trust claim was dismissed on the ground
that the stream was not a navigable water subject to the public trust doctrine.
Nestle´ was nonetheless enjoined because the court found the proposed with-
drawal unreasonable under the balancing test applicable to disputes between
riparian and groundwater users, to the extent that the withdrawal would cause
the loss of recreational uses of the stream and lasting changes to its natural
characteristics.48  The opinion was reversed in part on standing grounds, and
the company subsequently agreed to limit pumping to 218 gallons a minute,
approximately half of the amount initially approved by state regulators.49
The controversy continues.  In December 2007, Ohio Congressman Den-
nis Kucinich, a perennial presidential candidate, convened a House oversight
subcommittee hearing to consider the environmental impact of bottled water
operations.50  It appears likely that the congressional query is aimed at greater
federal oversight of the industry.51
Although neither Sun Belt nor Nestle´ has made significant inroads in cre-
ating markets for bulk water transfers, it takes little imagination to envision a
Sun Belt-like company orchestrating a large-scale water transfer from the
water-abundant Great Lakes or the Ogallala Aquifer to the thirsty and growing
44 Szydlowski, supra note 42, at 677.
45 Eric Reguly, Water Fight with U.S. Has Just Begun, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 23, 1999, at
B2.
46 Klein, supra note 25, at 1260.
47 Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d in part, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
48 Id. at 208-09.  The court remanded for a determination of the level of water extraction
from Sanctuary Springs that would provide the defendant with a fair participation in the
common water supply while maintaining an adequate supply for plaintiffs’ water uses. Id. at
209.  The case was subsequently reversed in part for lack of standing with respect to a lake
and wetlands where plaintiffs owned no land and provided no evidence of their use of the
areas in question. Mich. Citizens, 737 N.W.2d 447.
49 See Todd Spangler, Nestle:  We’re No Danger to Michigan, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec.
13, 2007, at 4; Water Dispute, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 26, 2007, at A2.
50 Spangler, supra note 49.  Nestle´ offered testimony about the socio-economic benefits of
its Ice Mountain enterprise. Id.
51 Id.
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West.52  Next time, it just might be some well-heeled corporation with plenty
of capital and influence to throw around.  Remember Enron?  According to
New York Times reporter Tim Egan, in 2001, Enron’s water division, Azurix,
revealed its plan to exploit what it called a “global industry worth about $400
billion.”53
Enron, the nation’s No. 1 marketer of natural gas and electricity, saw water as a
commodity that would eventually be deregulated, just as electric power was in Cali-
fornia.  If that happened, Enron would be free to buy and sell water to the highest
bidders—no different from oil or megawatts. . . .  But Enron discovered that water
was not as easily corralled as oil or gas.  Public agencies and consumer groups, many
critical of Enron’s role in the debacle of energy deregulation in California, fought the
company and others pushing for privatization.54
After two years of “prospecting for liquid gold,” Azurix collapsed, with
losses of over $300 million.55  Enron’s water division was not alone in its
demise.  Enron itself has since declared bankruptcy and been dissolved.56  But
the prospect of water riches is so enticing that Nestle´, Mesa Water, Sun Belt,
and other Water Barons are surely waiting in the wings.  After all, “water flows
to money and power.”57
There is at least some political support for large-scale, transbasin water
speculation, at least from the arid Southwest.  In October 2007, during the
course of his bid for the Democratic nomination for president, New Mexico’s
Governor Bill Richardson caused an uproar when he suggested that water from
the Great Lakes could be piped to the Southwest.  Richardson rationalized that
the Great Lakes states are “awash in water.”58  Michigan’s Democratic Gover-
nor Jennifer Granholm responded swiftly and unequivocally:  “Hell no.”59  If
adopted by all of the member states and approved by Congress as an interstate
compact, Annex 2001 would pose an obstacle to water exports from the Great
Lakes.60  If not, a unilateral ban on water exports would likely fail a dormant
commerce clause challenge.61
52 See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS (2006) (describing growing pres-
sures to transport Great Lakes water to Asia and other far-flung places).
53 Timothy Egan, Near Vast Bodies of Water, Land Lies Parched, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2001, at 1.
54 Id. Apparently, Enron attempted to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar Everglades
restoration effort to purchase and sell the water resources captured by the project, but the
proposal gained no traction.  Klein, supra note 6, at 21 (citing Michael Grunwald, How
Enron Sought to Tap the Everglades:  Water Unit Lobbied Jeb Bush on Privatization Bid,
but Access Led Nowhere, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1).
55 Egan, supra note 53.
56 In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1564 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 4, 2001); Matt Moore, Enron Seeks Chapter 11 Protection:  Energy Company Files
Suit Against Dynegy for Dropping Buyout, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2001, at A2.
57 LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW, at ix (1991)
(quoting Peterson Zah, Navajo Tribal Chairman).
58 Tim Jones, Great Lakes Key Front in Water Wars, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2007, at 1.
59 CNN Newsroom Transcripts, Oct. 13, 2007, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0710/13/cnr.05.html.  Ironically, at one point, speculators proposed to pipe Great Lakes
water to the Western High Plains to replenish depleted portions of the Ogallala Aquifer. See
Editorial, Saving the Great Lakes, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1985, at 8.
60 See Great Lakes Charter Annex, supra note 40.
61 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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Governor Granholm need not lose too much sleep, however, because
large-scale, transbasin diversions are, as yet, the exception rather than the
rule.62  In part, this is a simple matter of economics—the cost of transporting
water, a heavy and unwieldy substance, long distances has, in the past, out-
weighed the financial benefits.  The lack of significant numbers of large-scale
transfers also reflects concerns about externalities and adverse third-party
effects.63  Even if the pressures of a rapidly-diminishing supply and an ever-
increasing demand change this dynamic, as may be likely in the not-too-distant
future, the basic elements of prior appropriation law pose a significant impedi-
ment to bulk water transfers.  The anti-speculation doctrine, in particular,
stands in the way of some of the most ambitious marketing proposals.
III. AVOIDING SPECULATION THROUGH THE TRINITY OF BENEFICIAL USE
Beneficial use is the lynchpin of the prior appropriation system, as it is
“the basis, measure, and limit” of a water right.64  All western water codes
encapsulate the “doctrinal trinity of beneficial use, waste, and forfeiture.”65
Many western state constitutions explicitly include the term “beneficial use.”66
The definition of beneficial use is similar among prior appropriation jurisdic-
tions, and it typically includes just about any domestic, agricultural, or indus-
trial activity, including sewage treatment, crop production, stock watering,
hydroelectric power generation, mining, and recreational pursuits.  It does not,
however, extend to speculative water uses.
A. The Elements and Underpinnings of the Beneficial Use Doctrine
The holy trinity of western water law—beneficial use, waste, and forfei-
ture—has three fundamental purposes.  The first, avoiding speculation, is
designed to advance the other two:  maximizing the use of a scarce resource
and providing flexibility to water users.67
62 Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West:  1987-2005, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1043 (2007); Howitt, supra note 29, at 6.  According to Professor
Joseph Dellapenna, “true markets for water [have] been rare,” although “certain administra-
tive regimes . . . have been misdescribed as ‘markets.’”  Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Impor-
tance of Getting Names Right:  The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 317, 327 (2000).
63 Klein, supra note 6, at 22-24; see Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of
Tradable Property Rights to Water, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2005, at 49, 55
(concluding that states should not adopt a model of tradable property rights in water because
of high transaction costs and “significant irreversible economic, environmental, social
equity, and legal consequences”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 38-39
(describing potential harm to streamflows, wetlands, habitat, air quality, and aesthetic
qualities).
64 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 923-24 (“Statutes of nine states intone in nearly identical
language that ‘beneficial use, without waste, is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right,’
and the remainder refer in some way to beneficial use.”) (footnote omitted)).
65 Id. at 922.
66 Id. at 923.
67 Id. at 962-63.
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An applicant for an appropriative right must demonstrate both the intent to
appropriate water for beneficial use and an overt act manifesting this intent.68
If water is put to beneficial use, the user develops a prior appropriation right,
which is typically reflected in a state-issued permit or judicial decree.  As
between users, a person holding a senior appropriative water right has an exclu-
sive right to use a specified amount of available water for a specified purpose at
a specified time and place.69  The appropriator may not, however, merely pos-
sess the water and may not waste it.  Water rights holders who fail to show
continuous beneficial use may lose the water right through abandonment or
forfeiture.70  These requirements are intended to ensure that the public’s water
resource is available to those who actually need water.71
All western states prohibit speculation in water rights.72  Colorado law, for
example, specifies that no appropriator “may obtain a right to use a portion of
the public’s water resource unless it establishes intent to make a non-specula-
tive appropriation.”73  Other states implicitly prohibit speculation through their
definition of beneficial use.74
Speculation is the act of acquiring a resource for the purpose of subse-
quent use or resale. Black’s Law Dictionary defines speculation as “[t]he buy-
ing or selling of something with the expectation of profiting from price
fluctuations.”75  Speculators in water do not acquire water rights for the pur-
68 Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 310 (Colo.
2007) (requiring that the appropriator establish that it “can and will put the conditionally
appropriated water to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time”).
69 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1529, 1541 (1989) (noting that “a water right is . . . merely the right to continue a
particular, existing pattern of water use . . . with a specific economic and social result”).
70 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-290, 46-294 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.060
(2007).
71 David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism:  Distributive Justice in the Creation of
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 9, 22 (2005).
72 See Neuman, supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Federal reserved rights for Indian
reservations and federal lands, however, are not subject to state law prohibitions on specula-
tion or provisions for forfeiture. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574-78 (1908)
(stating that reserved rights vest when created, not when put to use); Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that reserved water rights are not
lost through non-use), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see also infra Part IV.C (examin-
ing reserved rights as an exception to the anti-speculation rule).
73 Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist., 170 P.3d at 314; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-
305(9)(b) (2007).
74 See Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150, 154 (2006) (defining a perfected water right as
having been actually diverted and applied to an approved use); Maricopa County Mun.
Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Sw. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 382-83 (Ariz. 1931) (stating
that an appropriator must perfect a water right by applying the water to a beneficial use);
Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. N. Idaho Props., Inc., 577 P.2d 9, 19 (Idaho 1978) (describing
state law requirements for the development of water rights as including beneficial use as well
as rules against speculative rights, but noting that these rules are not applicable to federal
reserved rights); Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992) (requiring
appropriation by diversion and application to a beneficial use to perfect a water right).
75 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1435; see Speculate – Definition from the
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Speculate
(last visited May 28, 2008) (“Speculate” means “to assume a business risk in hope of gain;
especially:  to buy or sell in expectation of profiting from market fluctuations.”).
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pose of immediately utilizing the water by applying it to beneficial use, but
rather with the hope that water values will increase over time, allowing the
water rights holder to sell those rights in the future for a substantial gain while
locking up the resource from contemporaneous uses in the meantime.76
Speculation is not necessarily a bad thing.77  “Speculative fever” was an
important driving force in the development of the West—so long as there was
“equal opportunity speculation open to ordinary folks as well as wealthy capi-
talists,” acquiring something for the purpose of selling it at a premium was
encouraged.78
Today, with some constraints, the law allows speculators to hold real
estate, stocks and bonds, grain, art, precious metals, and all sorts of other prop-
erty for future uses.79  But speculative buying or selling frenzies, whether in
real estate or rubles, can have catastrophic, destabilizing effects on the nation’s
economy.  When the bubble bursts, as it did in the stock market crash of the
Great Depression and the savings and loan scandals of the 1990s, investors and
consumers alike are drug down with it.80  The current sub-prime mortgage
76 See, e.g., Vidler Water Company, http://www.vidlerwater.com/html/the_company.html
(last visited May 28, 2008).  Vidler Water Company bills itself as a water acquisition and
trading company that invests in water for this stated reason:  “The Company believes that
continued growth in water demand will generate rate adjustments to its water contract prices
that meet or exceed the rate of inflation, while the value of its underlying resources may
continue to appreciate.” Id. PICO Holdings, Inc., a holding company traded on NASDAQ,
owns Vidler Water.  Pico Holdings Inc. – Stock Information, http://investors.picoholdings.
com/stockquote.cfm (last vistited May 28, 2008).
77 See Neuman, supra note 15, at 972-73 (“It is perfectly acceptable for land developers to
buy land and simply hold it empty until the value appreciates and then sell or develop the
land at a profit.  It is equally acceptable for speculators to attempt to acquire and control
certain scarce resources, such as precious metals or valuable minerals, for later sale at a
profit.”).
78 Id. at 964; see also PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST:  THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 67 (1987).
79 See A. Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys Become Indians?  Protecting Western Communities
as Endangered Cultural Remnants, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 539, 546 n.28 (1999) (explaining that
“the United States was settled as a series of rapidly moving frontiers with very low popula-
tion densities . . . .  Cities were laid out to encourage real estate speculation . . . .”) (citing
JOHN W. REPS, TOWN PLANNING IN FRONTIER AMERICA 422-29 (1965))).  The Internal Reve-
nue Code provides myriad incentives for speculators. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 165, 1031,
1211-1212 (2000) (providing limited tax relief for real estate developers and other specula-
tors by authorizing them to use losses against income or to carry losses over to other tax
years, and by giving favorable treatment to like-kind exchanges).  Congress has taken steps
in recent years, however, to protect consumers and the economy from the destabilizing
effects of over-leveraged real estate companies and speculative bank investments. See Cath-
erine L. Pollina, Note, Bursting the Speculation Buying Bubble:  Modifications to the Capital
Gains Provision and the 1031 Exchange Rule, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 271, 278-80 (2007)
(observing a dramatic upward trend in speculative investments in commercial real estate and
noting regulatory efforts to mitigate potential adverse effects).
80 Edward Iwata, Housing Market Troubles Still Look “Pretty Gruesome,” USA TODAY,
Aug. 9, 2007, at B3; Jeff Manning, Risky Lending Mortgaged Life of an Industry, OREGO-
NIAN, Aug. 26, 2007, at A01; Gretchen Morgenson, In the Subprime Crisis, the Lending
System was Less Than Prime, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 26, 2007, at 13.  The sub-prime
crisis arose when lenders gambled by making adjustable rate mortgages to borrowers with
poor credit histories.  The explosive growth in this aggressive type of lending in the past
decade has had a devastating effect on some communities.  Jim Rokakis, The Shadow of
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debacle is a case in point.  In 2007, there were 79% more home foreclosures
than 2006, due to speculative lending practices by banks and mortgage compa-
nies that took the chance that high-risk borrowers would be able to continue
making their monthly payments.  In some cases, lenders enticed purchasers to
take out more credit than the home was worth by offering low initial interest
rates that would adjust with the prime rate over the life of the loan.81  As a
result, the nation swung from a “buying frenzy to a foreclosure frenzy.”82  Over
two million households experienced foreclosure in 2007 and similar numbers
are expected in 2008.83  Not only have mortgagors lost their homes, interest
rates have surged, monthly payments have skyrocketed, the economy is falter-
ing, unemployment is on the rise, and both U.S. and global investors have seen
the value of their portfolios plummet.84  Meanwhile, according to the Com-
merce Department, new home sales fell 25% in 2007, a record decline.85
Despite the risks, it remains common for investment companies to hold
immense inventories of real estate, simply for investment value.86  By contrast,
“it is hard to picture similar treatment for water,”87 both because of its unique
physical characteristics and because of its unique treatment in western history
Debt, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2007, at B1.  Investing in sub-prime mortgages resulted in
heavy losses when interest rates rose, increasing the debt service and eventually outpacing
the property’s income and forcing wide-spread defaults on the loans.  Pollina, supra note 79,
at 278; see Christopher Thornberg, Fannie and Freddie, Old and New, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2007, at A27 (stating that sub-prime loans “allowed Americans to speculate on real estate as
never before”).
81 Mike Barris, Foreclosure Filings Surged 75% in ‘07 as Subprime Mess Grew, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 29, 2008, at D3; Alex Veiga, Foreclosures in 2007 Jump to Record, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Jan. 30, 2008, at 76.
82 Veiga, supra note 81 (quoting Rick Sharga, vice president of marketing for RealtyTrac).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Shobhana Chandra, U.S. Housing Starts Drop to Lowest Level Since 1991, BLOOM-
BERG.COM, Jan. 17, 2008, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid
=AOla8HtUMRaA.  Overall economic growth generally declines in tandem with U.S. con-
struction rates. See Shobhana Chandra, U.S. Housing Starts Slide to Lowest Level Since
1993, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 17, 2007, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&
refer=home&sid=A1t40XgWe6TY (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke:
“Housing will be a ‘significant drag’ on the economy into next year as ‘conditions in mort-
gage markets remain difficult’”).  Although residential investment represents only four per-
cent of the Gross Domestic Product, the housing sector is considered a strong indicator of
near-term economic trends.  Economic Indicators (By the Numbers) – Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/bythe.html#housing (last visited May
28, 2008).
86 See Jim Clayton et al., Real Estate Comes of Age, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Special Issue
2007, at 15, 15, 17 (stating that “[r]eal estate has gained wider acceptance as a legitimate
institutional investment . . . [and] now attracts the best minds in the world of financial eco-
nomics”); James R. DeLisle, Economy Set for Soft Landing, 74 APPRAISAL J. 318, 318
(2006) (“Despite the uncertainty and risks in the current environment, one constant that
continues to hold is the appeal of commercial real estate as an asset class and the market’s
willingness to accept low current yields relative to historical averages.”); Neuman, supra
note 15, at 972-73 (“It is perfectly acceptable for land developers to buy land and simply
hold it empty until the value appreciates and then sell or develop the land at a profit.  It is
equally acceptable for speculators to attempt to acquire and control certain scarce resources,
such as precious metals or valuable minerals, for later sale at a profit.”).
87 Neuman, supra note 15, at 973.
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and law.  When it comes to water, the consequences of a market crash are not
only economically threatening, they may be life-threatening.
Western history provides valuable context for our analysis of the modern-
day prohibition on water speculation.  Prior appropriation arose during the late
1800s as a way to encourage and support western settlement and economic
development by allowing maximum use of a scarce but essential resource—
water.88  Experiences with scarcity led western societies to believe that the
gains from private management of water would outweigh the costs of establish-
ing and enforcing a system of private rights.89
Although the oft-repeated story is that westerners simply followed the cus-
toms of the mining camps in the use and allocation of water, the underlying
objectives were almost certainly more complex.  Prior appropriation’s roots are
as likely to be found in the populist inclinations of homesteaders and other
settlers, who abhorred speculative maneuvering by monopolistic land barons
and railroad companies.90
The fear of concentrated power over resources in the developing West
shaped the doctrine of beneficial use.91  Concerns about monopoly were part of
a larger social movement and a much bigger set of issues, including populism,
the burgeoning interest in conservation of public lands and wildlife, and Teddy
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, a progressive platform of his 1912 election cam-
paign.92  The same sentiments played a role in shaping the provisions of the
homestead acts, which required actual settlement and occupancy to obtain title
to land,93 as well as the Reclamation Act, which favored small farmers by lim-
iting delivery of water to 160-acre parcels.94
According to legal historian Samuel Wiel, when the western states’ consti-
tutions were being adopted in the late 1800s and early 1900s, constitutional
conventions embodied a strong sentiment against wealth and monopolies.95
The railway and steamship lines were considered especially villainous, but con-
cern about excessive power spread to other public services, including water
supplies.96  The rejection of riparian rights was one means of preventing an
88 Id. at 967.
89 Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  A Study of the Ameri-
can West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 177 (1975).
90 Schorr, supra note 71, at 9, 25-29, 33, 49.
91 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
92 Neuman, supra note 15, at 964 (citing SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST-
ERN STATES 166 (3d ed. 1911)).  Roosevelt believed that a powerful federal government was
essential in order to curb private property rights and guarantee social justice. PATRICIA
O’TOOLE, WHEN TRUMPETS CALL:  THEODORE ROOSEVELT AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE
(2005); see infra Section V (describing antitrust efforts).
93 See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).  The Taylor Grazing
Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (2000), effectively drew the homesteading era to a
close, and the 1862 Act was officially repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976. See Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means:  Values,
Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American
“Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 99-104 (2005) (outlining historic and political
underpinnings of the Land and Homestead Acts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
94 43 U.S.C. § 431.
95 WIEL, supra note 92, at 149.
96 See id. (discussing the adoption of the California Constitution in 1879).
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owner of just a few acres of land on a stream from locking up the water for that
single parcel and thereby impeding the settlement of surrounding land.97
Moreover, the adoption of prior appropriation, by definition, required the
appropriator to apply the water to beneficial use, thereby precluding speculative
hoarding in hopes of future gain.98
Through application of the beneficial use doctrine, territorial courts and
legislatures ensured that actual users had an opportunity to make contempora-
neous applications of water to beneficial purposes.99  Modern legal doctrine has
retained the beneficial use requirement and the attendant prohibition against
speculation through judicial decrees and statutory provisions.100
Just as would-be Water Barons are not unique to the West, the fear of
water hoarding is not unique to the West.  Under the riparian rights regime
followed in the eastern United States, speculation in water is limited by virtue
of the doctrine’s requirement that the water be used on the adjacent riparian
tract of land.101  Because riparian water rights can be sold only in tandem with
the sale of the riparian parcel under the common law riparian system, the only
way a person could speculate on the value of the water would be to hold onto
the land until the land and/or water right attached to it increased in value.102
Although it is possible to purchase a riparian parcel for the purpose of specula-
tion in water, and a riparian does not lose water rights through forfeiture for
non-use, as would be the case in the West, the likelihood of speculative water
marketing schemes is minimized by a number of factors, including the common
law duty to share water with other riparians,103 to use water in a reasonable
97 Id. at 189 (citing Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290 (Utah 1891)).
98 Neuman, supra note 15, at 963-64.  Professor Tarlock adds an interesting historical tidbit
on the origins of the beneficial use requirement and the correlated anti-speculation doctrine
in his treatise on water rights:  “The roots can be traced to Mormon irrigation practices in
Utah.  From its earliest days wandering the frontier, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints conditioned the privilege of property ownership on the productive, non-speculative
use of the property and policed the distribution of essential commodities.” A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:66, at 5-118 (2007) (citing L.
ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM:  ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
1830-1900, at 53 (1958)).
99 High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 n.3
(Colo. 2005) (citing Schorr, supra note 71, at 33, 41, 55-56).
100 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a) (2007) (describing speculation as a situa-
tion in which the purported appropriator lacks a right to use “the lands or facilities to be
served by such appropriation,” or lacks “a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or other-
wise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses”).
101 See, e.g., Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Mich. 1967) (holding “riparian
rights are not alienable, severable, divisible or assignable apart from the land which includes
therein or is bounded by a natural water course”).
102 See, e.g., Janice Francis-Smith, Oklahoma Landowners Cash in on Groundwater Rights,
J. REC. (Okla. City), Jan. 10, 2008, at 3, available at 2008 WLNR 756979 (Oklahoma allows
“landowners the right to pull about two acre-feet of water per year for each acre of land they
own” and use it for a “beneficial use,” including selling it to municipalities, making “[t]he
practice of buying . . . land to obtain more water rights . . . a hot topic.”).
103 See Elmore v. Ingalls, 17 So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1944) (recognizing the long-standing view
that a right to use water was limited by a duty not to impair the rights and uses of other
landowners); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862) (noting that riparian water
rights are confined by the rights of other riparians’ reasonable uses); White’s Mill Colony
Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 811, 817 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (abutting landowners are entitled
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fashion,104 and to use water only within the watershed of origin.105  These
requirements, in effect, ensure that no one user can hoard water rights for future
sale in hopes of gaining a windfall.
Moreover, the fear of water hoarding is not unique to surface water bodies.
Many states have inhibited speculation in groundwater by limiting usage to
overlying lands.106  A few states have explicitly applied the anti-speculation
rule to “tributary” groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface
waters.107  Colorado applies it to Denver Basin designated groundwater,108 and
to make reasonable use of water from a lake for any lawful purpose, so long as their use does
not interfere with the rights of those above, below, or on the opposite shore).
104 See Three Lakes Ass’n v. Kessler, 285 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (specify-
ing reasonable use factors:  the size, character, and natural state of the water course; the type
and purpose of the uses proposed and their effect on the water course; and the benefits to the
proposed user balanced against the injury to other riparian owners).
105 See Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. 1907) (holding that ripari-
ans must establish that the water was used within the watershed); McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1341 (Haw. 1973) (holding appurtenant rights to use water may
only be used in connection with the parcel of land to which the right is appurtenant and may
not be transported to another watershed); Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988) (stating that water must be kept within the watershed to protect down-
stream riparians’ expectations of return flows).  These requirements have been altered in
some states by statutory permitting systems. TARLOCK, supra note 98, §§ 3:90, 3:99; see,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-373(b) (2007) (providing that the state must consider a num-
ber of considerations in granting permits for water use, including economic, environmental,
and navigational concerns, as well as “existing and planned water uses”); FLA. STAT.
§§ 373.019(16), 373.223 (2007) (authorizing issuance of permits to transport water outside
of the watershed so long as the use is considered a “reasonable-beneficial use,” defined as
“the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a
purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest”).
In the early 2000s, the Georgia legislature considered a proposal to revise its water code to
create tradable rights to surface and groundwater withdrawal permits, in hopes of defusing
intra- and interstate conflicts, but it was defeated. Draper, supra note 63, at 49.
106 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES:  CASES AND MATER-
IALS 371-77 (3d ed. 2000) (describing American “reasonable use” rule of groundwater usage
on overlying properties); Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Follies:  Groundwater Pumping
and the Fate of America’s Fresh Waters, by Robert Glennon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 476
(2004) (book review) (stating that most eastern states follow the American rule, which is a
“non-liability rule so long as the water is used for a reasonable use . . . on a tract that overlies
the aquifer from which the water is drawn”).  There are five different doctrines of ground-
water rights (and various permutations to those doctrines) in the United States, and some
allow off-tract use. See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903) (providing
that all overlying owners have a right to a proportionate share of the groundwater basin, but
also authorizing non-overlying landowners to appropriate surplus groundwater); Sipriano v.
Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999) (applying a rule of capture to
groundwater).
107 See, e.g., Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 746 P.2d 515, 517 (Colo. 1987)
(applying the anti-speculation doctrine to groundwater and denying an application for with-
drawals because “the applicant hope s to sell the water in the future, but presently has no
contractual commitment/s/ for the purchase of the water for a beneficial use”); Bacher v.
State Eng’r, 146 P.3d 793, 797-99 (Nev. 2006) (stating that an applicant seeking an
interbasin groundwater transfer must have a definite relationship with the party intending to
put the water to beneficial use and must specify the intended beneficial use of the appropria-
tion); Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Wash. 1998) (noting that state
statutes governing surface appropriations also apply to groundwater appropriation). But see
E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109 P.3d 154,
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ311.txt unknown Seq: 18  8-AUG-08 13:23
Spring 2008] ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE 1011
Nevada appears to apply the doctrine to all surface and ground waters in the
state.109  Texas, however, does not follow this approach, instead allowing
Water Barons like T. Boone Pickens to transfer water to far-away purchasers
for any purpose, speculative or not.110
B. Are Water Rights Fully Transferable Property?
The anti-speculation doctrine’s populist underpinnings, and the legal
restraints on alienation for speculative purposes, do not reflect anti-property
sentiment.  To the contrary, in many western states, it is commonly accepted
wisdom that appropriative rights are a form of property.111  Most judicial opin-
ions make it abundantly clear, however, that a water right does not constitute
ownership of the water itself; rather, it is usufructuary, or a right to use
water.112
The laws applicable to water, treating it as a semi-privatized yet commu-
nity-based resource, are highly distinctive and apply to “virtually nothing
else.”113
The roots of private property in water have simply never been deep enough to
vest in water users a compensable right to diminish lakes and rivers or to destroy the
marine life within them.  Water is not like a pocket watch or a piece of furniture,
which an owner may destroy with impunity.  The rights of use in water, however
long standing, should never be confused with more personal, more fully owned,
property.114
158 (Colo. 2005) (holding that courts cannot apply the anti-speculation doctrine to an adjudi-
cation of non-tributary groundwater rights, but noting that, nonetheless, the appropriator can-
not obtain a well permit without demonstrating actual beneficial use).
108 Colo. Ground Water Comm’n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62,
78 (Colo. 2003).
109 Bacher, 146 P.3d at 797-99.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that an application by
Vidler Water did not violate the anti-speculation doctrine, as a third-party landowner/devel-
oper had authorized Vidler to act as its agent in acquiring water resources for the develop-
ment of a power plant, the housing for MGM Grand casino and mall employees, and the
expansion of an outlet mall, but that the application was defective nonetheless because the
evidence of the water user’s need to import water from a basin was insufficient to support
the State Engineer’s decision to grant the application, as there was no evidence as to how
much water each project would require and how that quantity would be reduced by water
user’s unused, existing water permits. Id. at 801.
110 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80 (holding that, absent designation of a special management
district, the rule of capture allows the use of groundwater wherever the user deems fit).
111 TARLOCK, supra note 98, § 1:1. But see Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder,
Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (abstract available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=sandi_zellmer) (argu-
ing that a water right under the prior appropriation system is not property for purposes of
regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment because it is not an irrevocable interest in the
exclusive possession and use of a discrete, marketable asset).
112 John C. Peck, Title and Related Considerations in Conveying Kansas Water Rights, J.
KAN. B. ASS’N., Nov. 1997, at 38, 39.
113 Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers:  Community Rights and the Privatization of
Water, 1 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 13, 14 (1994).
114 Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 482
(1989).
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Accordingly, unlike acquisitions and transfers of personal property or real
estate, water has not been treated as an ordinary commodity, and transactions in
water involve a variety of unique considerations.  Surface and hydrologically
connected groundwater resources serve a wide range of ecological, cultural,
and economic values.  As water is taken out of the hydrologic cycle for human
use, ecological functions and cultural values may be dramatically impacted.
Moreover, water is shared among many users, both instream (hydroelectric
power, recreational activities, and fisheries, for example) as well as out-of-
stream.115
Once secured through application for beneficial use, appropriative water
rights generally can be conveyed by deed, lease, mortgage, or inheritance as an
appurtenance with a conveyance of the land where the water was initially put to
use.116  Changes in place or type of use are tightly controlled by state statutes
and common law, however, to ensure that no harm will come to other appropri-
ators.117  In addition, in some states, changes and transfers are forbidden if
unreasonable adverse effects to other third parties, such as riparians, or the
general public interest would occur.118  Moreover, the anti-speculation doctrine
applies to water transfers, just as it does to the initial acquisition of water rights,
because water rights holders can only transfer the amount that has been applied
to beneficial use and the recipient must continue its beneficial uses or forfeit
the right.119
As a result of these constraints, permanent transfers of water away from
the land on which it was initially used have been relatively infrequent, despite
the increasing need to transfer senior priorities to other uses and locations to
promote more socially and ecologically valuable uses.120  There are a handful
of exceptions to the anti-speculation doctrine that have operated to free up
water transfers in certain limited cases, however, as described below.
IV. YET, MUNICIPAL AND FOREIGN SPECULATORS ABOUND
There are several categories of statutory and common law exceptions to
the anti-speculation rule in western water law.  Two of the most significant
apply to municipal water supplies and foreign water.  The third enables Indian
115 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Water Banks:  Untangling the Gordian Knot of Western
Water, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1 (1995).
116 Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries:  A Fifth
Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1336 (2006).
117 Id.; see Freyfogle, supra note 69, at 1544 n.65 (explaining that “water rights are
bounded by the no-harm rule, which, though necessary to reduce otherwise overwhelming
harmful externalities, transforms a water entitlement into a use right that lacks the exclusiv-
ity of ownership which effective markets require”).
118 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-294(1)(d) (2007).  In contrast, restraints against aliena-
tion of real property are highly disfavored.  61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on
Alienation § 90 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (SERVITUDES) § 3.4 (2000) (“A
servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the burdened estate is invalid if the
restraint is unreasonable.”).
119 High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 714, 719
(Colo. 2005); see TARLOCK, supra note 98, § 5:78 (describing continuing beneficial use as a
requirement of water transfers).
120 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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tribes to market their water rights despite not having put them to historic con-
sumptive use.  A final exception allows water banking or use forbearance for
the maintenance of instream flows and other specified purposes.  Each of these
exceptions serves as a “safety valve” of sorts, alleviating the impediments
posed by the anti-speculation doctrine for unique entities (municipalities and
tribes), unique sources (foreign waters), or uniquely important public values
(flowing riverine habitat and conservation).
A. Municipal Growth
Each system of water law in the U.S.—prior appropriation, riparian rights,
and the law of groundwater use—gives a sort of “super-preference” to munici-
palities.121  If push comes to shove in a contest over scarce water resources,
cities almost always win.  The dedication of water to urban use tracks the long-
standing preferences for domestic applications.122  However, as a result, water
law allows, if not encourages, virtually unrestrained urban expansion.123
Two closely related doctrines have allowed cities to grow by carving out
exceptions from the anti-speculation doctrine.  First, the “progressive growth”
doctrine allows claimants, typically cities, developers, or irrigators, to perfect
their water rights by documenting their anticipated needs for water.124  In other
words, claimants may hold onto an unused block of water rights in anticipation
of future needs without losing priority or forfeiting the rights.125  The appropri-
ated water need not be immediately used to the full extent possible, provided
there is a bona fide intent to use the water and the appropriator proceeds with
due diligence.126
A second concept, the “growing communities” doctrine, is applicable only
to municipalities.  Like the progressive growth doctrine, it allows municipal
providers to appropriate water to meet their anticipated future needs by con-
structing a “properly scaled water system” that reflects reasonable population
121 A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable Water
Use:  If There Are No “Natural Limits,” Should We Worry About Water Supplies?, 27 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 48 (2006) [hereinafter Tarlock & Van de Wetering, West-
ern Growth]; A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and West-
ern Water Law:  From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 163 (1999); see Janis E. Carpenter, Water for Growing Communities:  Refining Tradi-
tion in the Pacific Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 127, 128 (1997) (citing Frank J. Trelease, Pref-
erences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133, 158-60 (1955)) (describing
municipal power to upset existing water use patterns and calling for an appraisal of the
privileges granted by states to municipal suppliers).
122 Tarlock & Van de Wetering, Western Growth, supra note 121, at 48.  Several western
states, including Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, North Dakota, and Nebraska, have adopted
statutory preference schemes that place domestic uses first, agriculture second, and manufac-
turing third in the hierarchy of use.  Robert E. Beck, Use Preferences for Water, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 753 (2000).  Junior users with preferred uses may exercise private eminent domain
over users with lower preferences in times of shortage. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6;
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-204, 70-668 to -672 (2007).
123 Tarlock & Van de Wetering, Western Growth, supra note 121, at 48.
124 Id. at 50-51.
125 Carpenter, supra note 121, at 128.
126 Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1256 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
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projections at the outset of a water development project rather than on a piece-
meal basis.127  Colorado law is fairly typical, in that it allows cities to perfect a
water right to the amount they will need in advance of demand in order to
satisfy projected population increases.128 In this spirit, Colorado courts have
described the reservation of water for Denver as “not speculation but the high-
est prudence on the part of the city to obtain appropriations of water that will
satisfy the needs resulting from a normal increase in population within a rea-
sonable period of time.”129
Cities might also escape the restrictions on speculation by seeking exemp-
tions from forfeiture provisions.  Many western states provide municipalities
with explicit statutory exemptions.130  The underlying rationale is that the
development of large-scale supplies for municipal purposes cannot, for all prac-
tical purposes, be held to strict “use it or lose it” requirements.131
Although technically not an exception to the anti-speculation rule, would-
be appropriators, including cities, may avoid its harshness to some extent by
seeking conditional water rights.  An appropriator who seeks a permit before
putting the water to beneficial use may secure conditional rights and thereby
reserve a place in the priority line for when the appropriation is complete.  To
obtain a conditional water right, the applicant must provide notice of the intent
to appropriate water as well as the ability to put the water to beneficial use
within a reasonable time, and must undertake some physical act to demonstrate
a substantial commitment to the project.132  To maintain a conditional right, the
127 Id. at 1258; see Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth in
New Mexico:  Same Old, Same Old or a New Era?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803, 829 (2003)
(citing St. Onge v. Blakeley, 245 P. 532 (Mont. 1926); State Eng’r v. Crider, 431 P.2d 45
(N.M. 1967)); see also Reynolds v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 624 P.2d 502, 506 (N.M.
1981) (allowing consideration of a city’s future water needs caused by increasing popula-
tion).  Some states consider the water system’s physical capacity (the “pumps and pipes”
test) to quantify the right, while others require specific details regarding the actual applica-
tion to beneficial use. Compare City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 839, 842
(Colo. 1939) (considering a diversion tunnel’s usable capacity in adjudicating a city’s water
right and noting that beneficial use determinations for cities must be “more flexible” than for
agricultural uses), with Theodoratus, 957 P.2d at 1246-47 (majority opinion) (rejecting the
“pumps and pipes” test, which had been followed in Washington for forty years).
128 Sheriff, 96 P.2d at 841; see Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited,
170 P.3d 307, 314, 322 (Colo. 2007) (citing, inter alia, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-
103(3)(a)(I) (2007), and Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co.,
594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979)) (explaining that, while private entities “must have contractual
commitments for any appropriations that are not planned for its own use, or the application
will fail as unduly speculative,” the burden is diminished for governmental suppliers who
face “a unique need for planning flexibility because it must plan for the reasonably antici-
pated water needs of its populace, taking into account a normal increase in population”);
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 40 (Colo. 1996).  Proponents of this
doctrine argue that “[w]aiting until the last minute to acquire water rights for a growing
community would be the height of irresponsibility.” Theodoratus, 957 P.2d at 1258 (Sand-
ers, J., dissenting).
129 Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836.
130 Neuman, supra note 15, at 965 n.332; see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-229.04(5) (2007);
N.M. STAT. §§ 72-1-9, 72-12-8 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-23 (2007); OR. REV.
STAT. § 540.610(2)(a) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4(5) (2007).
131 Neuman, supra note 15, at 965 n.332.
132 TARLOCK, supra note 98, § 5:61, at 5-103.
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appropriator may be required to file an application for a finding of due dili-
gence every few years.133  So long as the conditional right holder continues to
demonstrate the intent to put the water to beneficial use and exercises due dili-
gence in doing so, a conditional right can be held in perpetuity.  When all of the
elements of an actual appropriation are finally completed, the conditional water
right becomes perfected and declared absolute in a permit or judicial decree.134
In Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited, the Col-
orado Supreme Court imposed a new burden on cities:  conservation.135  It
directed the water court to make specific findings of fact not only about future
land use mixes, population projections for a normal growth rate, and per capita
water usage, but also about the effects of implementing conservation and reuse
measures on future water needs.  The water court was also instructed to deter-
mine whether the water suppliers had met Colorado’s “can and will” test; that
is, whether they can and will put the conditionally appropriated water to benefi-
cial use within a reasonable time period.136
The Pagosa Springs suppliers intended to use a reservoir on a tributary of
the San Juan River to provide a storage supply to buffer area residents and
businesses from the effects of droughts.137  They estimated that they would
need to triple their current storage capacity to 12,000 acre-feet to meet area
residents’ water needs by 2043.  Taking this a step further, they proposed to
develop the reservoir project with a total storage capacity of 35,000 acre-feet,
almost triple their estimated 2043 needs, in order to serve population growth
through the year 2100.138  Expressing skepticism about this scheme, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court cautioned the water court to “closely scrutinize” a govern-
mental agency’s claim for a planning period that exceeds fifty years, a period of
time that had been found reasonable in a previous case where the applicant had
“presented extensive evidence to support its projections of future water
demand,” including expert testimony, planning documents, and studies pre-
pared by water consultants.139
Conservation has emerged as a priority in other venues.  Santa Fe, for
example, has bucked the trend of seeking favorable treatment for new munici-
pal supplies by making water availability a determinant of future growth.  The
city has restricted new water connections outside city limits absent a valid,
preexisting agreement for water service.  It also adopted an ordinance requiring
new, large construction projects to transfer water rights to the city prior to
133 See Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Props., 54 P.3d 908 (Colo. 2002) (examining
Colorado’s six year filing requirement).
134 TARLOCK, supra note 98, § 5:61, at 5-103.
135 Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 314, 322 (Colo.
2007).
136 Id. at 320.
137 Jeff Kray, But Not Enough to Drink:  Water Scarcity Leads Colorado Court to Reject
Water Supplier’s Petition, MARTIN L. GROUP:  ENVTL. NEWS, Dec. 5, 2007, http://www.
martenlaw.com/news/?20071205-water-petition-rejected.
138 Pagosa, 170 P.3d at 311.
139 Id. at 317 (citing City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 40 (Colo. 1996)).
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receiving building permits.140  These innovative conservation measures mini-
mize the need to seek additional supplies continually to keep up with residents’
future demands.
Paradoxically, cities like Santa Fe that attempt to limit urban growth by
restricting water deliveries to amounts that can be sustained by reliable water
supplies face a dilemma—they may lack authority to deny service to new
developments.  Their power to defer or even deny the timing and manner of
development on private land may be inhibited by a public utility’s “duty to
serve” all customers within its service area, “provided that the system as a
whole can absorb the cost and still yield a reasonable rate of return.”141  Cali-
fornia has extended the duty to serve to water providers, requiring them to
acquire the necessary supplies to meet projected demands.142  States that follow
this model, in effect, require speculation on the part of municipal water suppli-
ers, at least as necessary to meet projected demands.
B. Foreign (Developed) Water
Much of the prior appropriation system is based on the notion that all
surface water flows within a watershed belong to the stream and are therefore
subject to appropriation by users.  By the same token, appropriators have no
expectation to water that was never part of the natural stream system.
Foreign or developed water is water that has been “added to the supply of
a natural stream and which never would have come into the stream had it not
been for the efforts of the party producing it.”143  Examples include water
derived from mine dewatering, water imported from another watershed, treated
sewage effluent, and non-tributary groundwater.144  To reward the developer’s
efforts to make more water available to the stream system, this so-called “new”
water is treated as the exclusive property of the developer, and is free of the call
140 Tarlock & Van de Wetering, Western Growth, supra note 121, at 65; see Julie Ann
Grimm, County Wades Into Long-Range Planning for Water Allocation, NEW MEXICAN,
Mar. 1, 2006, at A1.
141 Tarlock & Van de Wetering, Western Growth, supra note 121, at 58 (citing Reid Dev.
Co. v. Twp. of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 89 A.2d 667, 670-71 (N.J. 1952)).
142 Id. (citing Lurawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 146 P. 640, 645-46 (Cal. 1915)).
143 TARLOCK, supra note 98, § 5:18, at 5-33 (citing City & County of Denver v. Fulton
Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972)).
144 See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 72 (Colo. 1996)
(interbasin water transfer); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 834 (Colo.
1993) (non-tributary groundwater); Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (interbasin
water transfer and treated sewage effluent); St. John Irrigating Co. v. Danforth, 298 P. 365
(Idaho 1931) (springs in a “depression”); Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 654 P.2d 537 (N.M.
1982) (treated sewage effluent); Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irrigation Co., 149
P. 929 (Utah 1915) (mine dewatering); Dodge v. Ellensburg Water Co., 729 P.2d 631 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) (interbasin water transfer), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1031 (1987); Thayer
v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979) (treated sewage effluent).  Some states, in an
effort to integrate their surface and groundwater management, have begun to apply the anti-
speculation doctrine to groundwater supplies. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying
text.
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of the river.145  Accordingly, the developer is free to hold the water indefinitely
for speculative purposes.
Another form of developed water that may become a significant source of
water supplies in the future is precipitation generated by cloud seeding.  During
the Dust Bowl Era of 1930-1939, officials in towns throughout the Great Plains
called on rainmakers to shoot explosives into the sky in hopes of bringing
moisture.146  The pyrotechnics were typically shysters who sold nothing but
snake oil and empty promises.147
As far fetched as it may sound, interest in cloud seeding has reemerged
during recent droughts.  The State of Wyoming is spending millions of dollars
on experiments to test its efficacy, in partnership with other regional universi-
ties, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice.148  A private company is under contract to seed the target area’s clouds
with silver iodide.  Federal law has little to say on the subject, other than
imposing reporting requirements.149
The practice has not yet gained wide acceptance, but if it does, questions
about the use, allocation, and ownership of water produced by atmospheric
manipulation are sure to arise.  Causation—whether the cloud seeding pro-
duced the rain or snow being claimed—is likely to pose challenging legal
issues.150  If adverse effects, such as flooding or drought, occur inside or
beyond the target area, the developers’ liability for those effects will be in ques-
tion as well.  If it can be proven that the produced water has originated within,
and is therefore part of, the hydrological cycle of the watershed, it may be
subject to the call of the river; if not, it will be subject to application, manage-
ment, speculation, and transfer at the discretion of the producer.
145 Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 66 n.59; David Tighe, Comment, Colorado’s Foreign
Water Doctrine:  License to Speculate, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1113, 1126 (1989).
146 TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME:  THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO SUR-
VIVED THE GREAT AMERICAN DUST BOWL 190-92, 231-33 (2006).
147 See id. at 231-33 (reporting that one-tenth of an inch of snow was attributed to Tex
Thornton, a former wildcatter who peddled “meteorological magic” to citizens of Dalhart,
Texas, but in all likelihood his efforts only provoked more dust and sleepless nights).
148 See Univ. Corp. for Atmospheric Research, Wyoming Cloud Seeding Experiment Begins
This Month, UCAR, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2006/seeding.shtml.
149 National Weather Modification Policy Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 330a (2000).  Wyo-
ming’s plans may be delayed by a provision in the Forest Service’s Manual that precludes
weather modification over wilderness areas unless no “permanent, substantial changes in
natural conditions” and no visible alterations would occur. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL
§ 2323.45 (2006), available at http://nevadawilderness.org/items/document_FSWilderness_
Manual_2320.pdf; Brodie Farquhar, Cloud Seeding Hits Snag, JACKSON HOLE STAR-TRIB.,
Mar. 16, 2007, available at http://www.trib.com/articles/2007/03/17/news/wyoming/ace6a6
d2423a316f8725729f008034bb.txt.  The Wilderness Act of 1964 specifies that wilderness
areas are “untrammeled by man.”  16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000).
150 For a discussion of scientific and policy issues related to cloud seeding, see David J.
Gochis, Emergent Precipitation Enhancement Techniques and the Rights to Developed
Water (2001) (unpublished conference paper, Univ. of Arizona, Dept. of Hydrology &
Water Resources), available at http://www.awra.org/proceedings/dundee01/Documents/
GochisD.pdf.
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C. Indian Reserved Water Rights
Indian reservations and other federally reserved lands carry reserved water
rights as necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reserve.151  In the case of many
Indian tribes, the purpose of the reservation was to create a homeland for the
tribe and a means of subsistence through agriculture.152  Reserved rights have a
priority date as of the date of creation, making them senior to nearly all other
uses on many western river basins, and therefore extremely valuable.153  The
measure of an Indian reserved right is based on the “practicabl[e] irrigable acre-
age” of the reservation154
To settle long-standing Indian water rights claims, several recent federal
water settlement acts authorize water marketing by tribes.155  The acts typically
prevent permanent alienation of reserved water rights but authorize leasing for
limited time periods (ninety-nine or one hundred years is a fairly standard time
frame).156
Water marketing could become an important means for tribes to capture
the economic benefit of their resources,157 particularly where they had been
historically unable to develop water projects on the reservation itself.158  Tribal
151 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574-
78 (1908).
152 Winters, 207 U.S. at 574-78; see In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 76 (Ariz. 2001) (“‘[T]he general purpose, to
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally construed.’  Such a
construction is necessary for tribes to achieve the twin goals of Indian self-determination and
economic self-sufficiency.” (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,
47 (9th Cir. 1981))).
153 Winters, 207 U.S. at 574-78.
154 Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.  For a critique of this standard, see Gila River, 35 P.3d at 78
(“Limiting the applicable inquiry to a PIA analysis not only creates a temptation for tribes to
concoct inflated, unrealistic irrigation projects, but deters consideration of actual water needs
based on realistic economic choices.”).
155 See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCE J.
317, 339 (2006) (citing examples); Judith V. Royster, Indian Water and the Federal Trust:
Some Proposals for Federal Action, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 394-95 (2006) (citing
examples).  For extended discussion of tribal water rights, settlement efforts, and federal
expenditures, see DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS:  IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL
WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER (1987), and DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS:
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA (2002) [here-
inafter MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS].
156 Royster, supra note 155, at 395; see Tarlock, supra note 14, at 691 (describing market-
ing provisions of the Truckee-Carson Settlement Act).
157 David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water:  From Conflict to
Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 541-48 (1988); Royster, supra note 155, at 394-95;
Steven J. Shupe, Indian Tribes in the Water Marketing Arena, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 185,
196 (1990); Lee Herold Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation:  A Use
Consistent With the Reservation’s Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1988).  Professor Royster
has proposed a tribal water marketing act that would “authorize those tribes that wish to
engage in water marketing to submit plans to the Department of the Interior; once the mar-
keting plans are approved, the tribe would be free to market its water as it saw fit, without
secretarial approval of each specific transaction.”  Royster, supra note 155, at 397.
158 Royster, supra note 155, at 395.  For years, there were little or no tribal funds for water
projects, and most federal water development money has gone to non-Indian irrigation
projects.  Royster explains, “[T]he water rights of many . . . tribes are presently in use by
non-Indians.  Under the prior appropriation regimes of the western states, any unused tribal
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water rights that are transferred to an off-reservation party may be converted to
a state water right during off-reservation use, making them subject to some
state law provisions, but not provisions compelling forfeiture for non-use.159
As a result, tribes have the ability to engage in speculative hoarding—holding
onto the water until market conditions are most favorable—in a way that other
rights holders do not.  Explicit federal approval is likely required under the
Indian Non-Intercourse Act, however, before tribes can market their water.160
D. Water Banking and Forbearance for Instream Flows and Other
Purposes
The use of water banks to facilitate water marketing for specified purposes
is gaining acceptance in many western states.  Water banks provide a flexible
framework for water transfers, as there is no single required formula.161  Gen-
erally speaking, water rights are deposited in the bank and available for with-
drawal for a fee.  The bank serves as an intermediary that arranges the
transactions and maintains records.162  The pricing for water deposits and with-
drawals can reflect both the purpose of the new use—urban, industrial, environ-
mental, recreational, or agricultural purposes—and the location of use.163  For
example, prices may be higher for water that will be used outside the watershed
of origin.
To avoid forfeiture and to enable holding water for future uses, however,
legislation is typically required to facilitate water banking.  The State of Idaho
was one of the first to authorize a water bank nearly sixty years ago on the
Upper Snake River.164  Idaho law also authorizes a general purpose water bank
for facilitating temporary water transfers.165  The bank is designed to provide
flexibility to irrigators by allowing those who do not need water in a particular
year to grant it to others without forfeiting their water rights.166  The Idaho
Department of Water Resources was also explicitly authorized to use the bank
to provide instream flows for salmon runs on the Snake River.167
water is available for use by junior non-Indian appropriators until it is claimed by the tribes.”
Id.  As a result, unless tribes are able to enter into transactions with the users, tribal water
will continue to be used by non-Indians for free.
159 Id.
160 See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000) (requiring federal consent for any “purchase, grant, lease, or
other conveyance of [Indian] lands, or of any title or claim thereto . . . ”); TARLOCK, supra
note 98, § 9:42 (discussing tribes’ ability to transfer reserved rights).
161 MacDonnell, supra note 115, § 22.02.
162 See George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste:  Legal Barriers to Conserva-
tion and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1 (1979).
163 See id.
164 Idaho Water Resource Board, Idaho Water Supply Bank, http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/
waterboard/water%20bank/waterbank.htm (last visited May 28, 2008).  The bank is designed
as an exchange market where individuals can place excess water in storage or maintain it in
natural flows and others can purchase or lease this excess water. Id.
165 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1761 (2007).
166 Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 92, 104
(2003).
167 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1763B.
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In Colorado, water banks are authorized for all of the state’s major river
basins, but as of 2006 only one pilot water bank existed.168  A statute that
directs the state engineer to “promulgate program rules necessary or convenient
for the operation of a water bank within the division in which such district is
located” evidently requires specific rules to be adopted before a bank may be
established, thereby impeding water banking.169
The Oregon Water Trust, a nonprofit organization, has been a leader in
preserving instream flows through banking and other innovative approaches.
The Trust began buying water for streamflows in 1994, and it currently holds a
diverse portfolio of water rights, including permanent purchases, long-term,
short-term, and split-season leases, use forbearance agreements, and conserved
water projects.170  Within the first decade of its existence, it protected over 124
cubic feet per second of water in over 300 water rights deals.171  The Trust is
able to accomplish instream flow protection because in 1987 the Oregon legis-
lature recognized instream uses of water to be beneficial uses.172  It also speci-
fied that an existing water right converted to an instream flow right would
retain its priority date.173  According to Professor Janet Neuman, who served as
the first director of the Trust, a final key component of the 1987 law that served
as a catalyst for water marketing is the conserved water program, which allows
water rights holders to improve their efficiency and keep a portion of the water
saved.174  Absent this provision, the appropriator who accomplishes an author-
ized beneficial use with less water due to increased efficiencies would lose the
saved water to junior users or new appropriators.175
A related means of protecting instream flows while avoiding forfeiture and
anti-speculation constraints comes in the form of a forbearance agreement in
which the water user agrees to stop irrigating as of a certain date and to leave
the water instream in exchange for a cash payment or some other considera-
tion.176  Like water banking, forbearance agreements can be used for instream
flow maintenance, water transfers, or other purposes.
Forbearance agreements have been used as a tool to address severe water
shortages in Nevada and California.  During the 1990s, the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (“MWD”) and the State of Nevada agreed to
pay the Central Arizona Water Conservancy District to deliver Colorado River
water through the Central Arizona Project (“CAP”) to Arizona groundwater
168 See Reed D. Benson, “Adequate Progress,” or Rivers Left Behind?  Developments in
Colorado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36 ENVTL. L. 1283, 1304-05
(2006) (describing pilot water bank in the Arkansas Basin).
169 Id. at 1304 n.154 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5(1)(a) (2005)).
170 Janet C. Neuman, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly:  The First Ten Years of the Ore-
gon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432, 433 (2004).
171 Id. at 441.
172 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.334(1), 537.336(1) (2007).
173 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(1).
174 Neuman, supra note 170, at 439.
175 Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-188(A) (2007); CAL. WATER CODE § 1241
(West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222(2)
(2007); N.M. STAT. § 72-5-28(A) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 540.610(1) (2007); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-1-4 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.160 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-401
(2007).
176 Neuman, supra note 170, at 454.
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irrigators in exchange for rights to that groundwater.177  In turn, Arizona agreed
to forbear from using an equivalent portion of its Colorado River entitlement
and to give access to this “in-lieu” storage to Nevada and MWD.  This arrange-
ment increased the use and financial feasibility of the CAP, gave Arizona farm-
ers cheaper water than their pumped groundwater, and created a storage bank
for Nevada and MWD.178
Although negotiations over CAP repayment obligations eventually broke
down, the concept of developing a market for Arizona’s unused Colorado River
entitlement became an important part of developing Arizona’s groundwater
bank.  Arizona adopted legislation authorizing a state banking authority to
secure long-term supplies through groundwater storage credits, land fallowing,
and interim contracts for excess CAP water.179  The water bank can contract
with other states for acquisition and storage, and transfers from the bank can be
made through forbearance agreements.  Since 1989, the Arizona banking
authority has deposited about four million acre-feet of water in its underground
bank, but if a shortage is declared, “excess” CAP water uses, including banked
water, would be cut first because of CAP’s low priority among Colorado River
users.180
Negotiations on proposals to address shortages in the basin, California’s
chronic overuse, and Arizona’s surplus continued for years.  It was not until
December 13, 2007, that Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne finally
signed an agreement to implement a new strategy for management of the Colo-
rado River.181  The decision adopts interim operational guidelines intended to
provide a greater degree of certainty with respect to the amount of annual water
deliveries in the face of diminished supplies due to continuing or future drought
in the basin—particularly in the Lower Division states of Arizona, California,
and Nevada—and to encourage and promote water conservation.182  Conserva-
tion measures include an agreement allowing water users to obtain credit for
conserving water and leaving it in Lake Mead, forbearance provisions that
177 James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from
the Colorado River Part II:  The Development, Implementation and Collapse of California’s
Plan to Live Within Its Basic Apportionment, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 318, 344-45, 350-
51 (2003).
178 Id.
179 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-105, 45-801.01, 48-3710.
180 Matt Jenkins, Arizona Returns to the Desert, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 21, 2005.  The
authority can store water on behalf of California or Nevada.  Lochhead, supra note 177, at
350.  In 2004, the CAP Board approved a transfer of 1.25 million acre-feet to southern
Nevada in exchange for $330 million and Nevada’s support in protecting Arizona’s water
rights in negotiations between the Colorado River Basin states.  Henry Brean, Colorado
River:  Transfer of Water Approved, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 4, 2004, at 1A.
181 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Signs Historic Decision
for New Colorado River Management Strategies (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.
doi.gov/news/07_News_Releases/071213.html.
182 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDE-
LINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POW-
ELL AND LAKE MEAD 1 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf; see Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River
Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell
and Mead, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies.html (last visited May 28,
2008) (providing a summary and links to decision documents).
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allow parties to refrain from exercising their rights to Colorado River water,
and provisions for cities to contract with farmers to temporarily fallow fields in
dry years.183  Absent this agreement, and a provision of the Decree in Arizona
v. California,184 collaborative solutions involving forbearance agreements or
water banking may not have been possible under the existing Law of the
River.185
V. TRUST-BUSTING:  A DIVERSION INTO ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
In addition to the anti-speculation doctrine, antitrust rules designed to pre-
vent monopolies can also have a chilling effect on water marketing.  Theodore
Roosevelt is perhaps the most notable trust-buster in American history.  During
his presidency, he used the antitrust laws expansively to break up railroad trusts
and restrain steel magnates and other monopolistic interests.186  His antitrust
campaign extended to water supplies and waterways as well.  He fought against
the railroads’ ability to control ports and waterfronts,187 and against private
183 Press Release, supra note 181.  The interim guidelines also provide for new operational
rules for Lake Powell and Lake Mead to allow the two reservoirs to rise and fall in tandem,
thereby better sharing the risk of drought, and specify that, if the basin receives ample runoff
at any given time, the Department of the Interior will have rules in place to distribute the
extra water. Id.
184
 Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1963).  The Decree gives the Secretary some
discretion to distribute water among lower division states so long as California does not
receive more than 4.4 million acre-feet. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 593 (1963)
(stating that the Secretary “is free to choose among the recognized methods of apportion-
ment or to devise reasonable methods of his own”); see also Robert Glennon & Michael J.
Pearce, Transferring Mainstem Colorado River Water Rights:  The Arizona Experience, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 252 (2007) (describing the states’ proposal for marketing surplus waters
created through “extraordinary conservation activities” (dubbed “Intentionally Created Sur-
plus” (ICS)), to be distributed pursuant to the Secretary’s article II(B)(2) power and forbear-
ance agreements between the states).  For conflicting views about the Secretary’s ability to
make unused water in one state available for use in another state, see Robert Jerome Glennon
& Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon:  How and Why the Bush Administration Should
Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 922 (2002) (“[T]he Law of the River
contains numerous provisions that block transfers of water within the Colorado system and
serve to keep the initial, historic allocations intact.”); David E. Lindgren, The Colorado
River:  Are New Approaches Possible Now That the Reality of Overallocation Is Here?, 38
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-13 to -19 (1992) (stating that transfers are allowed);
Lochhead, supra note 33, at 324-29 (arguing that interstate, interbasin transfers are prohib-
ited).  For an assessment of the new interim guidelines, see Grant, supra note 10, at 979-80.
185 See Grant, supra note 10, at 979-80 (“The Secretary could not have implemented an ICS
program by regulation alone.”).
186 One means of curtailing the power of the big trusts was to do away with railroad rebates.
EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 417-18 (2001).  The rebates were used to favor certain
shippers who paid the established freight rates on their products up front and then received a
substantial proportion of the charges back from the railroads.  The public became enraged
about the practice when the influential publication, McClure’s, attacked the greed and
“secret, underhand” dealings of the trusts, and Roosevelt responded by championing new
legislation to empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish maximum rates.
Id. at 418, 427, 433-35, 442-43.
187 Col. Roosevelt’s Speech:  Says Greedy Interests Favor State Control, as Less Effective,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1910, at 2.
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companies that attempted to buy up entire watersheds in order to control the
water supply of a region.188
Although speculation and monopoly are often treated as twin themes, they
are not the same thing.  A monopoly entails super-concentrated market power,
where the monopolist’s control of so much of a resource enables it to depress
supply or quality and to inflate price.189  In reality, monopolization of water has
not been a significant concern in the West.190  There is no Wal-Mart, Exx-
onMobil, or General Electric of the water world; rather, 80% of the water with-
drawn from the West’s surface water bodies is used for agriculture, and
although concentration has grown in recent decades, the majority of agricul-
tural water rights holders are still individuals or small corporations.191  The
remaining 20% of the water being used in the West is spread among millions of
people, primarily urban dwellers.192
Individual appropriators can and do control large blocks of water—in
some cases all of the water of a stream—as long as they hold a senior priority
date and are actually using the water.  Yet power over localized water resources
by one or two farmers is not a monopoly in an economic sense.  It does mean,
however, that some streams are “held hostage to historic use patterns.”193
As interest in water marketing grows, the potential for collusion and, con-
sequently, antitrust concerns grow as well.  The Sherman Act prohibits agree-
ments or conspiracies that restrain competition as well as predatory or
anticompetitive commercial conduct through attempts to monopolize, or
through the acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power.194  Federal juris-
diction hinges on restraints that have a “not insubstantial” impact on interstate
188 WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 237 (1919).  An example of
Roosevelt’s resistance to water monopolies can be seen in the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43
U.S.C. § 431 (2000), which limits the size of parcels that benefit from water deliveries to
160 acres. MORRIS, supra note 186, at 114-15.  Roosevelt’s concern arose not only from his
distaste for monopolies but also from a desire to promote multiple-use management of rivers,
using them for navigation, flood control, hydropower, and water supplies.  Donald J. Pisani,
Water Planning in the Progressive Era:  The Inland Waterways Commission Reconsidered,
18 J. POL’Y HIST. 389 (2006).
189 Neuman, supra note 15, at 964 (citing VERNON A. MUND, MONOPOLY:  A HISTORY AND
THEORY 100 (1933)).
190 Id. at 964, 971.
191 Id. at 969 (citing W. WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM’N, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 2-22 to 2-23 (1998)).  As of the 2003 Farm and Ranch
Irrigation Survey, there were approximately 220,000 individual agricultural water rights
holders.  3 NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., FARM AND RANCH IRRIGATION SURVEY (2003),
at ix, xix-xx (2004), available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2002/FRIS/fris
03.pdf [hereinafter IRRIGATION SURVEY].  However, incursions by Fortune 500 companies
and large agribusinesses continue to grow.  Brian M. Riedl, Still at the Federal Trough:
Farm Subsidies for the Rich and Famous Shattered Records in 2001, HERITAGE FOUND.,
Apr. 30, 2002, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1542.cfm.
192 Neuman, supra note 15, at 969 n.358; see IRRIGATION SURVEY, supra note 191 (report-
ing a slight increase in watering efficiency per acre, along with a slight decrease in acres
irrigated, which indicates that the balance being used by urban users may have grown some-
what higher than 20%).
193 Neuman, supra note 15, at 969.
194 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).  The Sherman Act is supplemented by the Clayton Act of
1914, which was intended to prohibit trade practices that were not covered by the Sherman
Act or other existing antitrust acts, especially the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monop-
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ311.txt unknown Seq: 31  8-AUG-08 13:23
1024 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:994
commerce.195  In addition, the restraint must injure competition, which typi-
cally occurs when an agreement interferes with the setting of prices by market
forces.196  Finally, injury must have resulted from a contract, combination, or
conspiracy between separate entities; “unilateral action is not sufficient.”197
Existing patterns of water ownership may exacerbate the potential for
anticompetitive behavior, as coalitions of agricultural sellers and urban buyers
each attempt to control the market to their benefit.
[T]he predominant historic use of water has been for agricultural purposes; however,
the need has been shifting to uses urban in nature.  Thus, the buyers and sellers are
grouped in separate camps.  The tendency has been for these camps to combine
rather than compete. . . .  Thus, the would-be sellers join together in an attempt to
elevate prices, or the would-be buyers join together to hold prices down.  Normal
competition among and between buyers and sellers and the fostering of truly free
markets is thereby frustrated.198
Collusive geographically aligned coalitions might also emerge, as water-
rich regions band together to raise prices for sales to water-stressed areas.
“[A]reas where water originates often have an advantage of supply over export
areas.  Again, there appears to be a tendency by those within the respective
areas to combine to control the pricing of water.”199
Antitrust law may forgive collusive water marketing transactions from lia-
bility, however, particularly where state or local governments are involved.
Three doctrines come into play:  state action immunity, Noerr-Pennington
immunity, and local government immunity.
State action immunity has shielded water transfers from antitrust liability
in at least two circuits.200  In Kern-Tulare Water District v. City of Bakersfield,
the Ninth Circuit assessed a contract that gave the City a right to veto the
District’s subsequent sale of water initially purchased from the City.201  The
District brought an antitrust challenge when the City refused to approve the
District’s sale of surplus water.  The court concluded that there was a “clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition
with regulation in the area of municipal control over water and water rights, so
long as the municipality does not engage in waste or unreasonable use.”202
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that state action immunity protected a city
olies in their incipiency.  10A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPS. The Clayton Act § 4986
(2002).
195 Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 1989), aff’d, 500 U.S.
322 (1991).
196 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); see FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 639 (1992) (“No antitrust offense is more pernicious than price
fixing.”).
197 Stuart L. Somach & Andrew M. Hitchings, Antitrust Considerations in Water Market-
ing, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 1996, at 26, 27.
198 Id.; see Freyfogle, supra note 69, at 1544 n.65 (“Because sellers are few, a perfect
market [in water] does not exist and sellers have the power to exert strategic marketing
behavior, if not monopolistic control.”).
199 Somach & Hitchings, supra note 197, at 27.
200 Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
201 Id. at 515.
202 Id. at 519.  For discussion, see Somach & Hitchings, supra note 197, at 29.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ311.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-AUG-08 13:23
Spring 2008] ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE 1025
from antitrust liability for its allegedly anticompetitive operation of waterworks
by virtue of Georgia’s municipal statutes, which authorized cities to provide
waterworks service and to determine areas to be served.203  This means that
state legislatures can impact the scope of the immunity available under the state
action doctrine by the legislative decisions they make regarding the degree of
state and local regulatory authority over water resources.204
Noerr-Pennington immunity allows private individuals to seek favorable,
albeit anticompetitive, treatment from legislative bodies, administrative agen-
cies, and the courts.205  This doctrine protects the constitutional right to petition
the government, and it permits lobbying efforts that may harm competitors so
long as the efforts are expected to result in lawful government action.206  Thus,
landowners, when acting through their water district, are immune from antitrust
liability if they lawfully seek to influence their district’s decisions, for example,
by electing board representatives sympathetic to their position or lobbying
board members.207
Finally, the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 protects “local gov-
ernments” (a term that would likely include most public water agencies) from
antitrust liability.208  Normally, “any person . . . injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” is authorized to
“recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney’s fee.”209  The Local Government Act, however, specifi-
cally precludes the recovery of damages, costs, or attorney’s fees “from any
local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capac-
ity.”210  The Act also precludes such remedies “in any claim against a person
based on any official action directed by a local government, or official or
employee thereof acting in an official capacity.”211
In championing the local government immunity provisions, congressional
members argued that government action raises unique considerations.  Senator
Moynihan believed that antitrust damage suits filed against local governments
were having a “paralyzing effect on decisionmaking” so immunity was needed
to balance “the need of local governments to provide essential services—with-
out the fear of lawsuits—and the right of aggrieved parties to seek injunctive
203 McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 1992).
204 See id. (rejecting consumers’ claim against city for its allegedly anticompetitive opera-
tion of waterworks where Georgia’s municipal statutes specifically authorized cities to pro-
vide waterworks service and to determine areas to be served); Somach & Hitchings, supra
note 197, at 29 (“The role of antitrust law and policy in water rights marketing, therefore, is
likely to follow generally legislative policy on the role of the free market in the transfer of
water rights.”).
205 See Somach & Hitchings, supra note 197, at 29.
206 Hedgecock v. Blackwell Land Co., No. 93-16604, 1995 WL 161649, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr.
7, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 862 (1995); see also Davric Maine Corp. v. Rancourt, 216
F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2000) (lobbying for legitimate government purposes is immune from
antitrust suits).
207 Hedgecock, 1995 WL 161649, at *3.
208 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2000).
209 Id. § 15(a).
210 Id. § 35(a).
211 Id. § 36(a).
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relief against cities.”212  Others argued that antitrust concerns were less impor-
tant when it came to
environmental considerations, health considerations, safety considerations, and a
whole panoply of issues that a governmental body must take into consideration in its
judgments allocating contracts, access to sewer lines, zoning, and things like that. . . .
So the antitrust law is a square peg trying to be forced into a round hole of govern-
ment operation.213
As a result of these immunities, absent outright price-fixing or other serious
misconduct, water marketing transactions may evade liability when govern-
mental entities are market participants.214
VI. LIBERATING COLLABORATIVE FORCES WHILE KEEPING WATER
BARONS AT BAY
The requirement that water rights be put to an actual, non-speculative ben-
eficial use has served as a universal principle of western and indeed interna-
tional water law.215  This principle is being called into question, however, as
environmental and social priorities evolve.
Throughout the West, a diverse coalition of urban and Native American users,
environmental groups, and local watershed protection organizations are contesting
the traditional water allocation regime.  These groups have a common complaint:  too
much cheap water is allocated to agriculture and not enough is allocated to urban
users, Native American tribes, instream flow maintenance, and aquatic ecosystem
restoration.216
It appears, then, that it may be time for western water law to evolve as
well to better reflect these new demands.  Specifically, has the anti-speculation
doctrine outlived its usefulness?  Critics have lobbed several meritorious, yet,
in the end, unconvincing charges at it.  First, the doctrine may have the per-
verse consequence of fostering covert speculation.  In other words, prohibiting
water rights holders from reserving water for future use “merely force[s] the
would-be speculator to disguise his activity by wasting resources in the con-
struction of diversion works that are either economically unjustifiable regard-
less of their timing . . ., or are premature.”217  Although it is difficult if not
impossible to trace whether covert speculation is occurring and, if so, how
often and on what scale, it seems highly unlikely that a large number of indi-
viduals are intentionally pouring water on fallow fields for the purpose of sell-
212 130 CONG. REC. S14367 (1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
213 130 CONG. REC. H12183 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hyde).  For a detailed assessment of
the legislative history, see Palm Springs Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hosp., 628 F. Supp. 454,
459-64 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
214 Somach & Hitchings, supra note 197, at 29.
215 MIGUEL SOLANES & FERNANDO GONZALEZ-VILLARREAL, THE DUBLIN PRINCIPLES FOR
WATER AS REFLECTED IN A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ¶ 17 (1999), available
at http://www.africanwater.org/SolanesDublin.html.
216 Tarlock, supra note 14, at 674-75.
217 Stephen F. Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water
Resource Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7, 13 (1983).
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ing off their water rights at a later date.218  It is true that the prior appropriation
system encourages irrigators and other water users to err on the side of using
too much because the penalty for nonuse is loss of the water.219  But that is a
far cry from constructing diversion works and applying the water to a use with
no economic benefit, such as a crop with no subsistence value and no market,
just to hold on to the water in hopes of some lucrative future sale.220
It could also be said that anti-speculation rules prevent rational planning
for anticipated future growth.  But the prevalence of municipal exceptions,
described in Part IV above, undermines this argument, as does a recent survey
by researchers at the University of Arizona and the Bren School of Environ-
mental Management, which found that nearly half of all transfers in the West
occurred in the state with the reputation for having the most stringent anti-
speculation laws—Colorado.221  Most of these transfers involve the Colorado-
Big Thompson Project, a mutual water company that facilitates a transbasin
diversion of water from the West Slope to the Front Range.222
A third group of critics draw on the experiences of South America, which
has been moving toward privatization of water resources in the past few
decades.  Chile stands out as an example.  As a component of broad govern-
ment reforms toward a market-oriented economic policy by the authoritarian
government of General Pinochet, Chile’s 1981 Water Code did away with its
anti-speculation prohibition.223  The Code granted unconditional private water
rights that allowed owners to freely sell or change the type of use without
government approval.224  Water rights holders were not required actually to use
the water.225  The World Bank supported Chile’s approach to privatization,
reporting that it would improve water delivery, stimulate investment, and
reduce conflicts over water.226
It was not long before it became apparent that hydropower projects
belonging to a single corporation had purchased vast quantities of water rights
on a speculative basis, locking new entrepreneurs out of the market and making
water unavailable for actual, beneficial uses.227  Water marketing schemes also
spawned confrontations between native people and the government over indig-
218 Neuman, supra note 15, at 969.
219 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing forfeiture rules).
220 Neuman, supra note 15, at 969.
221 Brewer et al., supra note 62, at 1043.
222 Id. As “developed” water, it is subject to the complete control of the company.  Another
important feature of the Colorado-Big Thompson project involves the use of shares to
represent members’ interests in water, which in turn allows an active market for the shares
by minimizing transaction costs. Id. 
223 CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG:  CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL
REFORM 47-50 (2004).
224 Draper, supra note 63, at 54.  Administrative approval is apparently required, however,
for changes in location of diversions from natural channels. Id.
225 Rutgerd Boelens & Hugo de Vos, Water Law and Indigenous Rights in the Andes, CUL-
TURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 2006, 19, 19, available at http://www.cs.org/publications/Csq/
csq-article.cfm?id=1867.
226 Draper, supra note 63, at 55 (citing World Bank, Peru:  A User-Based Approach to
Water Management and Irrigation Development, World Bank Report No. 13642-PE (1994)).
227 SOLANES & GONZALEZ-VILLARREAL, supra note 215, ¶¶ 18, 110.
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enous lands and water resources.228  An in-depth analysis of the Chilean
approach concluded that, contrary to expectations, it was “incapable of han-
dling the complex problems of river basin management, water conflicts, and
environmental protection.”229  Social and environmental ramifications of water
marketing had been ignored while the economic benefits turned out to be
weaker than anticipated because there were no meaningful, effective mecha-
nisms for resolving conflicts or internalizing externalities arising from water
transfers.230
Chile amended its Water Code in 2005 and imposed a new annual tax on
unused water rights.231  As a consequence, water rights owners have been
induced to sell their unused water rights to avoid paying the tax, thereby stimu-
lating increased activity in water rights transactions.232  In the end, Chile’s
experimentation with rescinding its anti-speculation provision indicates that the
doctrine, along with the companion forfeiture rule, has continuing value.
A final argument for opening water markets to speculative transfers relies
on the existing “no harm” rule to address potential adverse effects to other
appropriators resulting from transfers or changes in use.233  Hence, market
principles should be allowed to take their course, so the argument goes,
allowing speculative transfers if the benefits exceed the costs so long as mecha-
nisms are in place to prevent harm to others.
The problem with this argument is twofold.  First, when it comes to water,
“perfect information is greatly lacking,”234 making it extremely difficult to
foresee and therefore prevent all harm to other appropriators.  Second, in most
states, the no harm rule does not protect third parties from harm, but only other
appropriators.235  Adverse social and environmental consequences of water
marketing go unrectified and, in many cases, unnoticed by the law.  Rescinding
the anti-speculation rule would not address this problem, but reforming the “no
harm” rule might.
228 See Lila Barrera-Herna´ndez, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource
Development:  Chile’s Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 13-14 (2005) (describing the Pangue-Ralco Project, a hydro-electric develop-
ment plan approved by the Chilean government in 1989 on traditional Mapuche lands).
229 BAUER, supra note 223, at 132.
230 Id. at 133.  For a description of the domestic and international backlash against priva-
tization of water supplies in Bolivia, see Salzman, supra note 8, at 96.
231 Miriam Grunstein et al., International Legal Developments in Review:  2006 Energy and
Natural Resources, 41 INT’L LAW. 491, 505 (2007) (citing Title XI of the Chilean Water
Code); see STEPHEN HODGSON, U.N FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., MODERN WATER RIGHTS:  THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE (2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a0864e/a0864e00.
pdf.
232 Grunstein et al., supra note 231, at 505; see Carl Bauer, Marketing Water, Marketing
Reform:  Lessons from the Chilean Experience, RESOURCES, Summer 2003, at 11, 13
(describing Chilean water markets as having “a limited impact on the efficiency of water use
and the reallocation of resources . . . due to a variety of constraints and transaction costs”).
233 See, e.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1962).
234 Freyfogle, supra note 69, at 1544 n.65; see Deborah Moore & Zach Willey, Water in the
American West:  Institutional Evolution and Environmental Restoration in the 21st Century,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 775, 800 (1991) (arguing “there are many potential impacts from water
transfers that need to be better understood if equitable and environmentally-benign transfers
are to occur”).
235 See, e.g., Green, 371 P.2d 775.
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As for overhauling the anti-speculation doctrine itself, with one caveat
described below, major reform seems unnecessary in light of existing excep-
tions, which temper the doctrine’s effects by allowing municipalities to plan for
future growth and by allowing human and ecological communities to benefit
from instream flow preservation.  These exceptions can bring conservation
options to light while fostering collaborative decisionmaking by bringing urban
and environmental interests to the table and providing a means to satisfy their
concerns.  Exceptions that enable Indian tribes to benefit from ancient yet long
unused reserved water rights are also appropriate.  Negotiated water rights set-
tlements have become an important means of effectuating tribal self-determina-
tion.236  In a typical negotiated settlement, the tribe agrees to relinquish its
“paper water” claims to reserved rights in exchange for a secure quantity of
“wet water” to be delivered through development projects constructed with fed-
eral funds.237  The agreement would be worth far less to the tribe if anti-specu-
lation and forfeiture constraints were imposed on its ability to use, store, and
market the water.
Of all the various exceptions to the anti-speculation doctrine, the excep-
tion for foreign or developed water is the one most in need of reform.238  As
Professor Christine Klein has observed, calling foreign or developed water
“new” is a misnomer with “alchemical overtones.”239  There is no way to cre-
ate new water within the hydrological cycle, as “[t]here is essentially the same
amount of freshwater on the planet today as there was 2,000 years ago.”240
Even desalination plants simply convert salt water to fresh water; the output is
not new.  Whether the water in question originated in a cloud above the water-
shed where it is to be used, in a groundwater aquifer, or in another basin, the
law should recognize that it is connected to the existing water supply and that
its use or sale has implications for other water users and surrounding
communities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Statutory expressions of beneficial use have changed and will continue to
evolve over time to reflect changed social values and new scientific under-
236 Royster, supra note 155, at 381, 395-97.
237 See MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS, supra note 155.  Professor Daniel McCool predicts that
negotiated water settlements will likely provide considerable benefits to tribes.  He examines
the features of fourteen negotiated settlements, commenting on the length of time to com-
plete settlements, the quantities of water promised to reservations, the degree to which a
more cooperative relationship between tribes and non-Indians has been achieved, and the
potential for off-reservation marketing. Id.
238 See supra Part IV.B (describing foreign and developed water).
239 Klein, supra note 6, at 14; see Tighe, supra note 145, at 1130 (“Allowing speculation
rights for reuse [of developed water] may well provide an incentive for importing more
Western Slope water instead of fully and efficiently using water naturally present on the
Front Range.”).
240 Klein, supra note 6, at 14; see Sandra L. Postel, Water Resources:  For Our Thirsty
World, Efficiency or Else, 313 SCIENCE 1046, 1046-47 (2006); Earth Observatory, The
Water Cycle:  A Multi-Phased Journey, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Library/Water/
water_2.html (last visited May 28, 2008) (describing the hydrological cycle).
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standing.241  But the time for rescission of the anti-speculation doctrine has not
yet come, and perhaps it never will.  There is still a strong sense that specula-
tion in water is just plain wrong.  This may be because we continue to be influ-
enced by our ancestors’ populist impulses and mistrust of corporate Water
Barons, but it may also signify more global concerns about privatization of
water.
Water marketing can be a viable tool among an array of collaborative
strategies for water management, yet because market forces tend to focus on
short planning cycles and fail to prevent the imposition of harmful externalities
on non-parties, market transactions have the potential to compromise the needs
of current and future generations of water users and to undermine governmental
authority over essential water resources.  Thus, to the extent that society envi-
sions marketing as a tool to reallocate water, governments must continue to
play a significant role in overseeing water transfers to ensure that the interests
of affected third parties are protected and the water remains available for bene-
ficial use.  More to the point, states must retain oversight and control of specu-
lative transfers, as federal law will rarely serve as an effective curb on water
profiteering or monopolistic behavior by water suppliers.242
241 Neuman, supra note 15, at 924; see Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common
Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 42 (1996) (“Beneficial use must expressly come to mean benefi-
cial by the standard of today’s culture, not by the standards of some culture long-eclipsed by
changing values and circumstances.”).
242 See supra Part V (assessing federal antitrust law as applied to water).
